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THE TROUBLE WITH AMICUS FACTS
Allison Orr Larsen*
ABSTRACT
T he number of amicus curiae briefs filed at the Supreme Court is at an
all-time high. Most observers, and even some of the Justices, believe
that the best of these briefs are filed to supplement the Court's understand-
ing offacts. Supreme Court decisions quite often turn on generalized facts
about the way the world works (Do violent video games harm children? Is a
partial birth abortion ever medically necessary?). To answer these ques-
tions, the Justices are hungry for more information than the parties and the
record can provide. The consensus is that amicus briefs helpfully add fac-
tual expertise to the Court's decision making.
The goal of this Article is to chip away at that conventional wisdom. The
trouble with amicus facts, I argue, is that today anyone can claim to be a
factual expert. With the Internet, factual information is easily found and
cheaply manufactured. Moreover, the amicus curiae has evolved signifi-
cantly from its origin as an impartial 'friend of the court. "Facts submitted
by amici are now funneled through the screen of advocacy. The result is
that the Court is inundated with eleventh-hour, untested, advocacy-
motivated claims of factual expertise. And the Justices are listening. This
Article looks at the instances in recent years when a Supreme Court Justice
cites an amicus for a statement offact. It describes the way the brief rather
than the underlying factual source, is cited as authority and addresses the
failure of the parties to act as an adequate check. I challenge this process
as potentially infecting the Supreme Court's decisions with unreliable evi-
dence, and I make suggestions for ways to reform it. It is time to rethink the
expertise-providing role of the Supreme Court amicus and to refashion this
old tool for its new purpose.
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INTRODUCTION
Amicus curiae briefs filed at the U.S. Supreme Court are on the rise-
up 800% over 50 years.1 These "friend of the court" briefs are filed for
any number of reasons: to make or reiterate a legal argument, to flag im-
plications of a law for an industry, to weigh in and show consensus on a
policy debate, or to ask the Court to steer clear of an issue altogether.
Perhaps the most influential type of amicus brief, however, is one that
adds new facts to the record.
1 Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on the
Supreme Court, 148 U. Pa. L. Rev. 743, 752 (2000); Kelly J. Lynch, Best Friends? Supreme
Court Law Clerks on Effective Amicus Curiae Briefs, 20 J.L. & Pol. 33, 34 (2004); see also
Paul M. Collins, Jr. & Lisa A. Solowiej, Interest Group Participation, Competition, and Con-
flict in the U.S. Supreme Court, 32 Law & Soc. Inquiry 955, 956 (2007) ("In recent years,
amici curiae have participated in over 80 percent of cases heard on the merits in the U.S. Su-
preme Court.").
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Supreme Court decisions today frequently turn on questions of so-
called "legislative fact"--generalized facts about the world that are not
limited to any specific case.2 These types of factual questions should be
familiar: Do violent video games harm child brain development?3 Does
racial diversity have educational benefits? 4 Is a partial birth abortion ev-
er medically necessary?5 The evidence the Justices use to answer these
questions is not limited in any respect. Claims of legislative fact come to
the Court's attention in a procedural hodge-podge: sometimes on the
record, sometimes presented by the parties, sometimes found by the Jus-
tices on their own, and-of interest here-increasingly presented
through briefs of amicus curiae.
The majority view is that this expertise-providing role for the amicus
curiae is a good thing.6 Political scientists and legal scholars have la-
2 The term "legislative fact" was coined by the legendary Kenneth Culp Davis over sixty
years ago to distinguish different types of fact finding in administrative agencies. See Ken-
neth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
Harv. L. Rev. 364, 402-03 (1942). Many others, including myself, have elaborated on the
concept since then, and the discussions have generated new names for this type of general-
ized fact. See, e.g., David L. Faigman, Constitutional Fictions: A Unified Theory of Consti-
tutional Facts 46-48 (2008) (further breaking down the category of legislative facts into
"constitutional doctrinal facts" that substantiate a particular interpretation of the Constitution
to help form a test, and "constitutional reviewable facts" that help apply a constitutional test
to similar cases); Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record
Factfinding, 61 Duke L.J. 1, 9-10 (2011) (describing legislative facts as "general facts about
the state of the world that are not particularly within the knowledge of the parties with stand-
ing to appear before the Court"); Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change,
2011 U. Ill. L. Rev. 145 (introducing the term "foundational facts"). But it is Davis's original
terminology on which I rely, as I have done in the past. For my prior work on the subject, see
Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 Va. L. Rev. 1255 (2012)
[hereinafter Larsen, Fact Finding]; Allison Orr Larsen, Factual Precedents, 162 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 59 (2013) [hereinafter Larsen, Factual Precedents].
3 Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738-39 (2011).
4 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).
5 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 165-66 (2007).
6 Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmak-
ing, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 965, 987 (2009) ("There has been no shortage of praise in the legal
literature for the ability of amicus briefs to 'inform the court of implications of a deci-
sion' ... [and] provide relevant factual information not offered by the parties."); James F.
Spriggs II & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Amicus Curiae and the Role of Information at the Supreme
Court, 50 Pol. Res. Q. 365, 365-66 (1997) ("Nearly all past research on amici curiae implic-
itly, if not explicitly, argues that amicus briefs convey critical and reliable information to the
Court .... Indeed, conventional wisdom suggests that courts often rely on factual infor-
mation or analytical approaches offered by amici, but not otherwise advanced by the parties
to the case.").
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beled this "educating" role of the amicus to be particularly valuable: 7 a
way to "alleviate costly information gathering" 8 by judges, and a critical
"tool to surpass the limitations placed on the court by an adversary sys-
tem." 9 While there are robust debates among academics about the influ-
ence amicus briefs have on case outcomes, 0 most seem to agree that
The chorus of praise has not been completely unanimous. There are those who have
warned that amicus briefs are just "advocacy documents." Richard A. Posner, The Supreme
Court, 2004 Term-Foreword: A Political Court, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 31, 48 (2005). And
some have questioned the reliability of amici on technical matters. See, e.g., Caitlin E.
Borgmann, Appellate Review of Social Facts in Constitutional Rights Cases, 101 Calif. L.
Rev. 1185, 1216 (2013) ("Amicus briefs, in particular, are often submitted by advocates and
may be replete with dubious factual assertions that would never be admitted at trial."); Go-
rod, supra note 2, at 60-61 ("[A]micus practice presents, at best, a limited and ad hoc oppor-
tunity for the presentation of adversarial ideas, not the structured opportunity for give-and-
take presented by the party-centered adversarial system."); Michael Rustad & Thomas
Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs,
72 N.C. L. Rev. 91, 94-95 (1993) (noting that while evidence introduced at trial will be sub-
ject to expert testimony and cross-examination, such safeguards do not apply to amicus
briefs); Linda Sandstrom Simard, An Empirical Study of Amici Curiae in Federal Court: A
Fine Balance of Access, Efficiency, and Adversarialism, 27 Rev. Litig. 669, 705-06 (2008)
(expressing concern that scrutiny from the litigating parties is complicated by issues of une-
qual resources and untimely access to the briefs).
7 Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Court: Examining the Influence of Amicus Curiae
Participation in U.S. Supreme Court Litigation, 38 Law & Soc'y Rev. 807, 815 (2004); see
also Keamey & Merrill, supra note 1, at 750 (reporting the claim that amicus briefs provide
"valuable new information" to the Court); David Orozco & James G. Conley, Friends of the
Court: Using Amicus Briefs to Identify Corporate Advocacy Positions in Supreme Court Pa-
tent Litigation, 2011 U. Ill. J.L. Tech. & Pol'y 107, 112 ("Under an information theory, the
briefs are useful if they expose novel facts."); Simard, supra note 6, at 682 (describing the
information theory of amicus briefs, which suggests that "amicus briefs are effective not be-
cause they provide a barometer of public sentiment, but rather because they supplement the
arguments of the parties by providing information not found in the parties' briefs," and find-
ing that "[t]his theory is more in line with the common thought that amicus briefs facilitate
judicial decisionmaking by educating the decisionmaker").
8Oman Scott Simmons, Picking Friends from the Crowd: Amicus Participation as Politi-
cal Symbolism, 42 Conn. L. Rev. 185, 207 (2009).
9 Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin After
the Friends Leave?, 41 Am. U. L. Rev. 1243, 1247 (1992).
10 See, e.g., Paul M. Collins, Jr., Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judi-
cial Decision Making 45 (2008) [hereinafter Collins, Interest Groups] (reasoning that the
Supreme Court's allowance of substantial amicus participation suggests that the Justices
view amici as a valuable aid in the decision-making process); Collins, supra note 7, at 827
(identifying the positive influence of amicus briefs as "marginal," while still recognizing that
the Court may be deferential to the interests of the executive branch and other prestigious
amicus participants); Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 6, at 381-82 (proposing that amici
that reiterate the arguments of the party are better off than those that exclusively add new
arguments).
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when providing specialized knowledge-filling in factual gaps for the
Court-the amicus is really at its best."
The Justices similarly applaud amicus expertise.' 2 Justice Breyer has
said that these briefs "play an important role in educating judges on po-
tentially relevant technical matters, helping to make us not experts but
educated lay persons and thereby helping to improve the quality of our
decisions."' 3 Justice Alito concurs, observing that "[e]ven when a party
is very well represented, an amicus may provide important assistance to
the court ... [by] collect[ing] background or factual references that mer-
it judicial notice."' 4 And former Supreme Court law clerks have re-
marked that it is the "non-legal" information provided by amici that is
the most useful. As one clerk publicly explained: "As a rule, the farthest
thing from a party argument is what is most helpful. For example, hard
facts or social science data .... Often you wish you knew more facts
than you get from a party brief.'
The Supreme Court may be hungry for more factual information than
the parties can provide, but this Article argues the amicus brief (at least
under current rules) is not the best place to find it. In a digital world
where factual information is exceedingly easy to access, more amici
than ever before can call themselves experts and seek to "educate" the
1 See, e.g., Jonathan Alger & Marvin Krislov, You've Got to Have Friends: Lessons
Learned from the Role of Amici in the University of Michigan Cases, 30 J.C. & U.L. 503,
504 (2004) ("Amici may be particularly helpful to the courts if they provide specialized
medical, technical, or scientific data or evidence otherwise not presented by the parties.");
Lucius J. Barker, Third Parties in Litigation: A Systemic View of the Judicial Function, 29
J. Pol. 41, 56 (1967) (highlighting amicus briefs' usefulness in providing social science da-
ta); Stephanie Tai, Friendly Science: Medical, Scientific, and Technical Amici Before the
Supreme Court, 78 Wash. U. L.Q. 789, 794-95 (2000) (recognizing that amici, especially
scientific and technical amici, may serve to inform the Court of the broader legal and policy
implications of its decisions); cf. Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advoca-
cy, 35 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 315, 317, 334, 337 (2008) (arguing for a First Amendment right to
file an amicus brief).
12A notable exception to this trend is Judge Richard Posner, who complains that amicus
briefs "increase litigation costs, evade page limitations, and promote 'interest group' politics
in the judicial process." Alger & Krislov, supra note 11, at 503 (quoting Posner). But even
Judge Posner asserts that the only amicus briefs he would allow are ones that can "present[]
ideas, arguments, theories, insights, facts, or data that are not to be found in the parties'
briefs." Voices for Choices v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 339 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 2003).
13 Justice Breyer Calls for Experts to Aid Courts in Complex Cases, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1998, at A17.
14 Neonatology Assocs., P.A. v. Comm'r, 293 F.3d 128, 132 (3d Cir. 2002).
15 Lynch, supra note 1, at 66.
Virginia Law Review
Court on factual matters. 16 In the 79 cases from last Term, for example,
61 of them involved an amicus brief filed to supplement the Court's fac-
tual understanding of the case.
17
It is a mistake to conclude that the Justices can easily tell which of
these amici are real factual experts and which of them are not. Most of
the names on the covers of the briefs sound neutral and mask the advo-
cacy that may be motivating them. The American College of Pediatri-
cians, for example, is a socially conservative group founded to protest
the adoption of children by gay couples, in opposition to the contrary
position taken by the similarly named American Academy of Pediat-
rics. With so much data out there and so many "experts" competing for
the Court's attention, it becomes increasingly difficult to sort the reliable
amici information from the unreliable.
And the Court is attempting to do so. My research shows that 1 in
every 5 citations to amicus briefs by the Justices in the last 5 years was
used to support a factual claim-something I define as a theoretically
falsifiable observation about the world. Of those citations, several sur-
prising patterns emerge. Less than a third of the factual claims credited
by the Court were contested by the party briefs. And more than two-
thirds of the time, the Justice citing the amicus brief for a fact cites only
the amicus brief as authority-not any accompanying study or journal
citation from within the brief. This indicates that the Justices are using
16 See Jeffrey C. Dobbins, New Evidence on Appeal, 96 Minn. L. Rev. 2016, 2052 (2012)
("More than any other type of brief filed at an appellate court, those drafted by amici contain
a significant portion of new evidence.").
I am referring to the cases heard during the 2012-2013 Term. These 61 cases were
counted because they had at least one amicus brief present factual studies or data in its table
of authorities.
18 Position Statements of the College, Am. Coll. of Pediatricians, http://www.acpeds.org/
the-college-speaks/position-statements (last visited Sept. 16, 2014) (stating that the mission
of the American College of Pediatricians is "to enable all children to reach their optimal
physical and emotional health and well-being"); For Policy Makers, Am. Coll. of Pediatri-
cians, http://www.acpeds.org/the-college-speaks/for-policy-makers (last visited Sept. 16,
2014) (listing studies such as "Marriage Rights for Homosexual Couples: Not the Best for
Children"); Press Release, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, American Academy of Pediatrics Sup-
ports Same Gender Civil Marriage (Mar. 21, 2013), available at http://www.aap.org/en-
us/about-the-aap/aap-press-room/Pages/American-Academy-of-Pediatrics-Supports-Same-
Gender-Civil-Marriage.aspx ("The American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) supports civil
marriage for same-gender couples-as well as full adoption and foster care rights for all par-
ents, regardless of sexual orientation-as the best way to guarantee benefits and security for
their children.").
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these briefs as more than a research tool. The briefs themselves are the
factual authorities, and the amici are the experts.
Political scientists and legal academics have done valuable work
tracking the number and type of amici,' 9 the rate of success of these
amici (measured by how often the side they favor wins),20 and most re-
cently (using plagiarism detection software) the frequency with which
Supreme Court opinions track language in amicus briefs.21 Surprisingly
little attention has been paid, however, to the role that almost everyone
agrees is the most valuable one for an amicus to play: that of factual ex-
pert. This Article fills that void by documenting the number of times the
Supreme Court cites to an amicus brief for a factual claim; it then raises
concerns about this use of"amicus expertise."
I make two central objections to the use of amicus briefs as factual
authorities: one substance-based and one process-based.
First, as to substance, I contest the notion that amicus-presented fac-
tual claims are reliable. Historically, the "friend of the Court" was a
lawyer who happened to actually be in the courtroom during oral argu-
ment. There was no preparation and no agenda in his participation. The
amicus today, however, has evolved significantly since its original in-
carnation. Now the norm is targeted amicus briefs authored by motivat-
ed interest groups, often coordinated by the parties, and submitted by
well-organized and well-funded players. As Judge Posner has observed,
these briefs are "advocacy documents" plain and simple.
22
This change matters because the studies, statistics, and articles mar-
shaled by these groups to support factual assertions are selected by those
with a "dog in the fight." The factual sources are chosen by amici, in
other words, for reasons other than that they are the industry standard,
the most peer-reviewed, or the most accurate state of our knowledge to-
day. And with the vast amount of information and studies available
19 See Collins, Interest Groups, supra note 10, at 45-50; Ryan J. Owens & Lee Epstein,
Amici Curiae During the Rehnquist Years, 89 Judicature 127 (2005); Simmons, supra note 8,
at 193, 209-14.
20 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 1, at 787-93.
21 Paul M. Collins, Jr., Pamela C. Corley & Jesse Hamner, The Influence of Amicus Curi-
ae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content (Aug. 8, 2013) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=2300505.22 Posner, supra note 6.
2014] 1763
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online now, it is not hard to assemble evidence to support a pre-existing
point of view.23
Indeed, I did some digging into the fact-based amicus briefs cited by
the Court and found several examples where the reliability of the infor-
mation presented is shaky at best. Sometimes, for example, the amicus
will cite a study that it funded itself. Sometimes the numbers supplied by
an amicus to support an assertion of fact are not even publicly available
but instead remain "on file with" the amicus. And it is not uncommon
for an amicus to present factual evidence that, in reality, rests on meth-
ods which have been seriously questioned by others working in the field.
This Article provides a handful of case studies of the Court's reliance on
amicus briefs for factual claims that-when one actually looks at the da-
ta in the brief-turn out to be resting on unsteady authority.
To date, the standard response to questions about "junk science" end-
24ing up in Supreme Court opinions is to resort to the adversary process.
While that may have been enough in a pre-Internet universe, it is insuf-
ficient today. The number of amicus briefs filed and the amount of
seemingly legitimate information available to present makes it very un-
likely that a litigant can adequately respond to amici-presented factual
claims.
My second objection to amicus expertise is more fundamental. No-
where outside the Supreme Court do we see this widespread eleventh-
hour supplementation of the factual record from sources that are not sub-
ject to cross-examination or other checks on reliability. The fact that the
U.S. Supreme Court is unique in educating itself about the world in this
way should give us pause. Unlike other legal decision makers (that is,
administrative agencies and trial courts), the U.S. Supreme Court is not
set up to sort through what is now a sea of factual claims coming from a
variety of actors who all claim to be experts.
This Article suggests that if the Court is going to continue to use ami-
cus briefs to answer factual questions, it needs to impose some quality
control safeguards-much like procedures that currently exist in admin-
23 For others who warn about reliability of Internet sources, see Jeffrey Bellin & Andrew
Guthrie Ferguson, Trial by Google: Judicial Notice in the Information Age, 108 Nw. U. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2331578.
24 See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis & Charles W. Mulaney, Judging Facts Like Law, 25 Const.
Comment. 69, 104-05 (2008) (arguing that the adversary process helps to make judicial fact
finding superior to congressional fact finding). The "junk science" quote comes from Rustad
& Koenig, supra note 6, at 97-99.
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istrative law and for expert witnesses at trial. What has happened, I
submit, is that the Supreme Court's desire for factual information has
outgrown what the amicus process can effectively and reliably provide.
We are using an old court-educating tool to address a new data-rich and
data-hungry world. The fit is off, the consequences are great, and it is
time to confront the tension.
I. HISTORY OF THE AMICUS CURIAE
A. Origins
The amicus curiae-or "friend of the court"-is in no way a new-
fangled idea. Dating back to Roman law, the original amicus was a "by-
stander, who without having an interest in the cause, of his own
knowledge makes suggestion on a point of law or of fact for the infor-
mation of the presiding judge., 25 In pre-eighteenth-century England, the
amicus was a neutral lawyer physically present in the courtroom who
would engage in an impromptu "oral 'shepardizing,' the bringing up of
cases not known to the judge. 26 Early courts welcomed this form of the
amicus curiae, on the theory that such neutral aids helped to avoid error
and "served to maintain judicial honor and integrity., 27
Interestingly, the original amicus was the lawyer, not the client-the
amicus curiae stood in "an essentially professional relation to the
Court., 28 "Organizations could not serve as amici curiae., 29 The word
amicus really described a professional relationship between a judge and
25 Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 Yale L.J.
694, 694 (1963) (quoting Benjamin Vaughan Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases 62-
63 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1879)); see also Collins, Interest Groups, supra note 10, at
38 (describing the origin of the amicus brief in Roman law); Ruth Colker, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor's Friends, 68 Ohio St. L.J. 517, 521 (2007) ("The practice of an outside law-
yer assisting the court existed in Roman law, throughout medieval England, and, in a limited
manner, within the French legal system."). For a dissenting historical account, at least of the
American amicus, see Stuart Banner, The Myth of the Neutral Amicus: American Courts and
Their Friends, 1790-1890, 20 Const. Comment. 111, 112 (2003) (rebutting the "convention-
al story of a transformation from neutral to partisan amici," and claiming that amici were
never neutral in America and the contrary view is just "a common but unrealistically nostal-
gic version of the history of American legal practice").
26 Allison Lucas, Friends of the Court? The Ethics of Amicus Brief Writing in First
Amendment Litigation, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1605, 1607 (1999); see also Collins, Interest
Groups, supra note 10, at 38 (discussing pre-eighteenth-century amici).27 Lowman, supra note 9, at 1248.
28 Krislov, supra note 25, at 703.
29 Simard, supra note 6, at 677.
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a lawyer. It was not until the early 1900s that courts began to attribute
amicus briefs to the organization that sponsored it rather than to the law-
yer who submitted it.3
Once the amicus arrived in America, the adversary system took hold
of it and it became common for an amicus to represent the interests of
another. The first American amicus to make a formal appearance at the
U.S. Supreme Court was the famed orator Henry Clay in an 1821 case
involving a Kentucky land dispute.3' Clay's role in the case was unique
at the time because he served both as an arm of the Court (the traditional
role of the amicus) and as an advocate for the non-party landowners.
Clay may have been the first American amicus, but he was by no
means the last. Throughout the nineteenth century it became increasing-
ly common for third-party interests to voice their concerns to the Court
through an amicus brief. Indeed, many think that the amicus flourished
in this country because of the limits on third-party representation in our
common law system. The amicus was, in other words, "a catch-all de-
vice for dealing with some of the difficulties presented by the common
law system of adversary proceeding., 33
The turn of the twentieth century, then, brought dramatic change in
the amicus business-a total shift, as one scholar frames it, from "neu-
tral friendship to positive advocacy and partisanship. 34 Historians have
pointed to several potential causes for the shift: the growth of interest
group politics generally,35 the bureaucratization of government that
made it easier to coordinate messages (the creation of the Department of
Justice and the National Association of Attorneys General, for exam-
ple),36 and the emergence of administrative agencies.37 Now amici are
30 Id.
31 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 17-18 (1823). For discussion of the case in de-
tail, see Krislov, supra note 25, at 700-01.
3 Clay argued that his appearance was justified because the Court's decision would affect
the rights of numerous people who were not parties to the dispute but had claims to the land.
He was allowed to participate-thus helping the Court and the landowners-although histo-
rians caution that this "debut of the amicus curiae in the Supreme Court must be recognized
as a dramatic and unusual one." Krislov, supra note 25, at 700-01.
13 Id. at 720.
14 Id. at 697.
31 See id. at 703.
36 See id. at 704-06.
37 See id. at 706.
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often compared to lobbyists.38 Many interest groups are established at
least in part for the purpose of participation as amici in appellate cases,
even calling themselves "acknowledged adversaries" or "litigating am-
ic[i]." 39 The evolution of the amicus from neutral bystander to "adver-
sarial weapon" 40 has generated a fair amount of criticism-both past and
present. In 1949, Justice Frankfurter complained that the amicus briefs
were embarrassing the Court: "I do not like to have the Court exploited
as a soap box or as advertising medium, or as the target, not of argu-
ments but of mere assertion that this or that group has this or that interest
in a question to be decided.,
41
Justice Frankfurter's desire to restrict amicus curiae did not ultimately
carry the day (indeed even he changed his mind on the subject by
1953).42 Today "[t]he general practice of the U.S. Supreme Court... is
to allow essentially unlimited amicus participation., 43 Rule 37 of the
Supreme Court Rules formally requires individuals and organizations
wishing to file amicus briefs to obtain consent from the parties (with the
exception of the federal government and individual states, who need not
seek consent).44 In practice, however, the overwhelming majority of par-
38 See Kearney & Merrill, supra note 1, at 783 ("Political scientists have long perceived an
analogy between interest groups lobbying legislatures and interest groups seeking to influ-
ence judicial decisions through the filing of amicus briefs."); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6,
at 96 ("Today ... many amici are lobbyists or representatives of special interests.").
39 Madeleine Schachter, The Utility of Pro Bono Representation of U.S.-Based Amicus
Curiae in Non-U.S. and Multi-national Courts as a Means of Advancing the Public Interest,
28 Fordham Int'l L.J. 88, 90-91 (2004) (alteration in original).
40 Michael J. Harris, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship in American
Jurisprudence, 5 Suffolk J. Trial & App. Advoc. 1, 6 (2000).
41 Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, Amici Curiae Before the Supreme Court: Who
Participates, When, and How Much?, 52 J. Pol. 782, 784 (1990) (quoting Memorandum for
the Conference from Felix Frankfurter (Oct. 28, 1949) (on file with the Earl Warren Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Black
expressed the opposite view: "Most of the cases that come before the Court involve matters
that affect far more people than the immediate record parties. I think the public interest and
judicial administration would be better served by relaxing rather than tightening the rule
against amicus curiae." Id. at 784-85 (quoting Memorandum for the Conference from Hugo
L. Black (Apr. 9, 1954) (on file with the Earl Warren Papers, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
42 Id. at 785.
41 Id. at 784.
44 Sup. Ct. R. 37(3).
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ties before the Supreme Court file blanket consent: "[L]eave to file an
amicus brief is granted as a matter of course. 45
As a consequence, the amicus practice at the U.S. Supreme Court has
exploded. The past 50 years have seen a dramatic increase both in the
number of amicus briefs filed and the number of times the Court cites an
amicus brief in an opinion.46 In fact, as others have observed, an amicus
brief is "now filed in virtually every case" the U.S. Supreme Court
hears, and, in big, marquee, end-of-June-type cases, amicus briefs will
regularly "number in the double digits." 7
B. The "Brandeis Brief" and the Birth ofAmicus Factual Expertise
The Supreme Court amicus has radically changed since Henry Clay
first represented the interests of Kentucky landowners. Not only are
amicus briefs more prevalent now, but they are also varied in their func-
tion.4 8
45 Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New Deal,
89 Tex. L. Rev. 1247, 1251 (2011); see also Collins, Interest Groups, supra note 10 ("[T]he
Court's modem rules and norms clearly allow for essentially unlimited amicus participa-
tion."); Stephen M. Shapiro et al., Supreme Court Practice 516 n.171 (10th ed. 2013) ("It is
becoming increasingly common for the parties to agree to provide 'blanket consent to ami-
cus curiae briefs' by letter to the Clerk-a trend that explicit reference to the practice in the
2013 revision to Rule 37.2(a) may accelerate.").
46 See Keamey & Merrill, supra note 1 (noting the 800% increase in amicus briefs filed at
the Court from 1946 to 1995); see also id. at 757 ("There is no question but that the total
number of references to amici is substantial, and that the frequency of such references has
been increasing over time."); Collins, Interest Groups, supra note 10, at 46-47 (depicting
graphically the increase in Supreme Court cases with at least one amicus brief filed); Lee
Epstein, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Court Era, 9 J.L. & Pol. 639, 645
(1993) ("On average, 84.4 percent of all full opinion cases decided between 1986 and 1991
contained at least one amicus curiae brief, compared with 28.6 percent during the Warren
Court era.").
47 Gorod, supra note 2, at 35-36 (citing Collins, supra note 7, at 807-08, 812); see also
Collins, Interest Groups, supra note 10, at 46 (demonstrating that amicus briefs were filed in
over 90% of the cases heard in the Supreme Court between 1990 and 2001); Lynch, supra
note 1, at 33-34 (noting that there were a record 107 amicus briefs filed in Grutter v. Bol-
linger and 33 such briefs in Lawrence v. Texas); Owens & Epstein, supra note 19, at 127-28
("The growth in amicus curiae participation - and perhaps the growing influence of amici as
well - was a fundamental part of the Rehnquist era .... [I]t is now the rare case in which at
least one amicus does not file.").
48 Political scientists have given us two essential theories on the modem role for amicus
briefs: (1) affected groups theory and (2) information theory. Affected groups theory sup-
poses that the Justices "look to amicus briefs as a barometer of opinion on both sides of the
issues." Simard, supra note 6, at 681 (quoting Kearney & Merrill, supra note 1, at 786). In-
formation theory, by contrast, suggests that the contents of an amicus brief matter, and in
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Most relevant, the twentieth century saw the birth of amicus briefs
filed to educate the Court on non-legal matters.49 It is this role of the
amicus-as factual expert-that has flourished in modem times and is
applauded by many scholars and jurists as the most valuable function an
amicus can perform.50 Indeed it is this role that is actually encouraged by
the modem Supreme Court rules, which explicitly call for amici to sup-
plement information the parties provide.5
So how did the amicus evolve from a lawyer who happened to be in
the courtroom spontaneously shepardizing cases to the 28 (out of 30)
amicus briefs filed in Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association
presenting studies on neuroscience? Most scholars agree that the change
can be traced to the turn of the century and the rise of the "Brandeis
brief."52
particular that they matter if they are supplementing the record with factual expertise. See id.
at 682; see also Spriggs & Wahlbeck, supra note 6, at 372-73 (finding that amicus briefs
routinely present new arguments and information, or reinforce existing arguments).
49 See Simard, supra note 6, at 682 (explaining that amicus briefs fill the valuable role of
"providing information not found in the parties' briefs," including, for example, "factual data
such as social science information that is absent from the appellate record").
50 See Dobbins, supra note 16 ("More than any other type of brief filed at an appellate
court, those drafted by amici contain a significant portion of new evidence. Amici are new-
comers to the case, and because they were typically not involved at the trial court level, they
may feel particularly unconstrained by the record review rule. In addition, because amici of-
ten have specialized knowledge and interests on the matters presented in a case, they are of-
ten a particularly rich source for new evidence on appeal." (footnote omitted)); Gorod, supra
note 2, at 36 ("[A]n amicus brief that will be of considerable help to the Court is one that
brings to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the
parties." (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 94 ("The
most common method of introducing social science evidence to the Court is through 'non-
record evidence' in amicus curiae briefs." (footnote omitted)); see also Abramowicz & Col-
by, supra note 6, at 968-69, 987 (arguing in favor of educating generalist courts on highly
technical matters and claiming that "amicus briefs have proven to be quite helpful" in this
matter); Tai, supra note 11, at 793 (calling for increased role of scientific and technical ami-
ci).
51 Rule 37 states that amicus briefs should not repeat party arguments and instead "may be
of considerable help to the Court" if they call attention to a matter "not already brought to its
attention by the parties." Sup. Ct. R. 37(1). As Brianne Gorod has observed, the rules "ex-
pressly encourage nonparties to use [amicus briefs] to assist the Court in engaging in extra-
record factfinding." Gorod, supra note 2, at 36.
52 See Richard B. Cappalli, Bringing Internet Information to Court: Of "Legislative Facts,"
75 Temp. L. Rev. 99, 99-100 & n.3 (2002); Marion E. Doro, The Brandeis Brief, 11 Vand.
L. Rev. 783, 789-90 (1958). But see Noga Morag-Levine, Facts, Formalism, and the
Brandeis Brief: The Origins of a Myth, 2013 U. Ill. L. Rev. 59, 61-62 (arguing that the prac-
tice of presenting scientific and medical evidence to the Court predates the Brandeis brief).
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A "Brandeis brief' is the colloquial name given to a brief filed at the
Supreme Court that presents non-legal data to aid the Court in making a
legal rule. 3 Its name comes from a pioneer brief filed by famed advo-
cate (and later Justice) Louis Brandeis in a 1908 case called Muller v.
Oregon.54 The plaintiffs in the case challenged a state law restricting the
number of hours women were allowed to work. Brandeis, filing a brief
in support of the law, adopted a remarkably revolutionary strategy. His
brief contained 2 pages of legal argument and 102 pages of evidence
about how women needed special protection from the hazards of long
work hours.55
To understand why this brief was so remarkable and influential (even
if the science it relied on has subsequently been debunked56), one must
remember the state of legal thought in 1908. In the late 1800s, law was
"largely regarded as a matter of logic."5 7 The height of legal formalism
saw legal decision making as a "technical-mechanistic process, as if it
were a procedure."58 This understanding of law as a logical undertaking
makes claims of generalized fact largely irrelevant.
In the early twentieth century, however, legal realists began to chal-
lenge this understanding of law by "frankly recogniz[ing] the courts'
lawmaking function."59 This shift naturally led to a significant change in
the role of fact finding. As Professor Ann Woolhandler helpfully ex-
plains, "After all, it only makes sense to provide courts with data to as-
sist in their lawmaking function if one sees courts as having such a func-
53 See Frederick Schauer, The Decline of "The Record": A Comment on Posner, 51 Duq.
L. Rev. 51, 55 (2013) [hereinafter Schauer, Decline of "The Record"]. As Professor Schauer
points out, the actual Brandeis brief was a party brief, not an amicus brief. Although it is a
critical "part of the widespread understanding of the use by American appellate courts of
non-legal social science data, it is important to remember that it was, after all, a brief, pro-
duced by a party and open to rebuttal by opposing parties." Id.
14 208 U.S. 412, 419 (1908); see also Cappalli, supra note 52, at 99 ("While it seems unex-
ceptional for today's judges to consult and cite legislative facts, the Brandeis brief was a bril-
liant leap into the future.").
55 See Doro, supra note 52, at 792; Schachter, supra note 39, at 105.
56 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 106 ("Brandeis's brief would be assessed harshly as
junk social science by today's standards.").
57 Doro, supra note 52, at 789.
58 Menachem Mautner, Three Approaches to Law and Culture, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 839,
851 (2011).59 Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 Vand. L.
Rev. 111, 115 (1988); see also Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in
Constitutional Law, 78 Calif. L. Rev. 1441, 1463-64 (1990) (discussing the Court's switch
to a post-formalist era).
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tion, as distinguished from a function of discovering law that is dictated
by text, precedent, and principle."60
The Brandeis brief had a "significant impact on legal thought"6' and
"marked a creative shift for the Court, introducing the use of vivid, fac-
tual detail as a way to break out of the formalist categories dominating
the analysis. 62 It was just the tip of the iceberg of briefs that presented
factual data to guide the Supreme Court's legal analysis. Prominent
twentieth-century examples should quickly come to mind: the psycho-
logical studies on the impact of segregation in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,63 the medical evidence about abortion in Roe v. Wade,6 and the so-
cial science data about affirmative action in Grutter v. Bollinger,6 1 to
name a few.
With facts more relevant to their decisions, it becomes important to
think about how the Justices access information that informs those facts.
How are they educated on, for example, abortion procedures or social
science studies on race? The Federal Rules of Evidence contemplate ex-
pert testimony if "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact., 66 At trial, such evidence comes through the
adversarial process and expert witnesses, where a party can challenge
the methodology or conclusions of the study in question. 67 Such evi-
dence then becomes part of the record which, traditionally, "rigidly cir-
60 Woolhandler, supra note 59; see also Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 101 ("The in-
corporation of sociological data into judicial decision-making is the result of the legal realist
movement.").
61 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 106.
62 Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term-Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101
Harv. L. Rev. 10, 88-89 (1987).
63 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n. 11 (1954); see also Paul L. Rosen, The Supreme Court and So-
cial Science 157 (1972) (explaining how the Court's use of social science data in Brown en-
dorsed the use of extra-legal data in constitutional interpretation); Schauer, Decline of"The
Record," supra note 53, at 55 & nn.23-24 (noting that the factual data relied on by the
Brown Court was discussed extensively in the NAACP brief in the case).
64 410 U.S. 113, 149 & n.44 (1973); see also Schachter, supra note 39, at 105-06 ("In Roe
v. Wade, the Court relied on numerous submissions by legal, medical, and religious organi-
zations to discuss the physical risks of abortion at various stages of pregnancy." (footnote
omitted)).
65 539 U.S. 306, 330-32 (2003); see also McGinnis & Mulaney, supra note 24, at 82 ("In
Grutter v. Bollinger, for instance, which upheld the University of Michigan Law School's
race-based admissions policy, the Court relied on factual assertions in the amicus briefs of
educational associations, businesses and some retired generals in finding that diversity in
education is a compelling state interest.").66 Fed. R. Evid. 702(a).
67 Schachter, supra note 39, at 106.
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cumscribed the limits of acceptable sources in arguments before and de-
cisions by appellate courts.,
61
Even after the influence of realism became apparent in the 1930s, the
extra-legal facts the Justices relied upon tended to come from the record
and within the bounds of the adversary system. As Professor Fred
Schauer observed recently, the psychological studies on the impact of
racial segregation used by the Brown Court were part of the proceedings
below. 69 Similarly, the Brandeis brief in Muller v. Oregon-while an in-
tegral part of the lore on the use of non-record facts-was "after all, a
brief produced by a party and open to rebuttal by opposing parties. 7 °
This helps us to appreciate, in Schauer's words, "what is new and
what is not.""71 "Once we see both Brown and the Brandeis Brief in con-
texts more limited than what they are commonly taken to represent,"
Schauer explains, "we can appreciate that judicial factual inquiry into
matters not argued below, not found in the appellate record or briefs, and
not discussed at oral argument is indeed a relatively new phenomenon,
fostered substantially by the ease of electronic research., 72
Somewhere along the way in this journey toward "judicial factual in-
quiry," the amicus brief became the Court's principal tool. "As the Court
became more willing to entertain extra-legal facts, political groups be-
gan to file amicus curiae briefs in significant numbers. 73 Political scien-
tists and legal scholars now tell us that "[m]ore than any other type of
brief filed at an appellate court, those drafted by amici contain a signifi-
cant portion of new evidence. 74 These briefs are filed after the record is
closed, and the information they present is not subject to cross-
examination below.
And these briefs seem to be making their mark.75 It is well known, for
example, that factual assertions by amici played an important role in the
68 Schauer, Decline of "The Record," supra note 53, at 52.
69 Id. at 55 & nn.23-24.
70 Id. at 55.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 56.
73 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 109.
74 Dobbins, supra note 16; see also Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 94 ("The most
common method of introducing social science evidence to the Court is through 'non-record
evidence' in amicus curiae briefs." (footnote omitted)).
75 For empirical support that Brandeis briefs make a difference on the Court's decisions,
see Keamey & Merrill, supra note 1, at 749-50. Professors Kearney and Merrill found sup-
port for the hypothesis that the Justices are "receptive to 'Brandeis Brief-type information
that sheds light on the wider social implications of the decision." Id. at 778.
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Court's 2003 decision upholding the University of Michigan Law
School's race-based affirmative action decision.76 Justice O'Connor cit-
ed one of the briefs by name in both her opinion and her oral summary
of the case from the bench. 77 And, in the 2007 Gonzales v. Carhart deci-
sion about partial birth abortion, Justice Kennedy relied on the assertion
by an amicus that women suffer psychological harm after abortion-
even though this was not one of the reasons Congress gave (in extensive
factual findings) for banning the procedure.78
Today it is exceedingly common, and quite often praised, for an ami-
cus to present the Court with extra-record factual information. The next
part of this Article will document the rate of Supreme Court citations to
amici as factual experts in recent years. It will then speculate as to rea-
sons for the trend, and explain why we should care.
II. SUPREME COURT AMICI AS FACTUAL EXPERTS TODAY
A. What Facts Are Amici Supplying and Why?
Before exploring how Supreme Court amici are cited as factual ex-
perts, a few words are necessary on my working definition of a fact. As I
have elaborated elsewhere, a factual statement (as opposed to a legal
one) is a claim that can be theoretically falsified and is typically sup-
ported by non-legal evidence.79 I certainly acknowledge that the line be-
tween law and fact is not easy to draw, but, like it or not, the distinction
is one that is entrenched in our legal system and one that most lawyers
use every day.
For the purposes of this paper, an assertion of fact is one that in theo-
ry can be true or false and that is followed by evidence ("Go ahead,
Google it"). Examples of facts supported by amici authority include:
claims on the general unreliability of eyewitness testimony,80 statistics
on the costs that libraries will face to determine copyright status of in-
76 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
77 See Lynch, supra note 1.
" 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007); see also Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protec-
tion: Abortion Restrictions Under CaseylCarhart, 117 Yale L.J. 1694, 1697-98 & n.15
(2008) [hereinafter Siegel, Politics of Protection] (noting the absence of congressional
findings on this point).
79 See my prior work for elaboration on my definition of a fact. Larsen, Factual Prece-
dents, supra note 2, at 69-70; Larsen, Fact Finding, supra note 2, at 1264, 1268.
80 Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 727 (2012) (citing brief for the American Psy-
chological Association).
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ternational works,8 and observations on common practices leading to
election fraud.82
The examples in this paper are not just facts, however: They are so-
called "legislative facts." Kenneth Culp Davis first defined a "legislative
fact" in 1945 as a fact that "inform[s] a court's legislative judgment on
questions of law and policy."83 Despite the name, a legislative fact need
not be found by a legislature (although it can be). It is best understood in
comparison to an "adjudicative fact" (also Davis's phrase), which is a
fact about any particular controversy-the who, what, where, when facts
of a dispute, or "the stuff of ordinary litigation. 8 4 A legislative fact is
not case-specific, but is rather a generalized claim about the state of the
world used "in the law-interpreting and law-making functions of appel-
late courts., 85 Examples of legislative fact questions are plentiful: Does
corporate money corrupt politics? 86 Is it inherently violent to flee from
police in a car? 87 When does an adolescent's brain fully mature?88
Legislative facts are not new of course. When Chief Justice Marshall
wrote the opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, he explained that "[a]ll America
understands, and has uniformly understood, the word 'commerce,' to
comprehend navigation., 89 This is technically, as Professor David Faig-
man has commented, a statement of legislative fact: an observation
81 Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 904-05 (2012) (citing briefs for the Conductor's Guild
and American Library Association).
82 Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2820 (2010) (citing brief for the Massachusetts Gay and
Lesbian Political Caucus "detailing 'bait and switch' fraud in a petition drive in Massachu-
setts").83 Davis, supra note 2, at 404.
84 Woolhandler, supra note 59, at 113. Note that Professor Woolhandler emphasizes a dif-
ferent aspect of the definition of legislative fact: "The key difference between adjudicative
and legislative facts is not the characteristics of particular versus general facts, but rather,
evidence whose proof has a more established place and more predictable effect." Id. at 114.85 Schauer, Decline of "The Record," supra note 53, at 57; see also Stuart Minor Benjamin,
Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78
Tex. L. Rev. 269, 273 (1999) ("Judicial opinions are filled with assertions about the state of
the world."); Brenda C. See, Written in Stone? The Record on Appeal and the Decision-
Making Process, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 157, 191 (2005) (stating that legislative facts are relevant
when "the court is in essence 'making law' either by filling a gap in the common law by
formulating a rule, construing a statute, or framing a constitutional rule").86 Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
87 Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2273 (2011).
88 Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010).
89 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 190 (1824).
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about the way most Americans understand language. 90 And even if that
statement does not seem "fact-y" enough, it is hard to argue that Justice
Blackmun's medical research about abortion procedures in 1973's Roe
v. Wade decision was pure legal analysis. 9'
Several things, however, are new and worth noting. I specify three:
the rise of the amicus brief, the impact of the Internet, and a general in-
crease of empiricism in the Court's decision making.
First, as mentioned above, the number of amicus briefs filed at the
Court has skyrocketed. Professors Joseph Kearney and Thomas Merrill
documented a dramatic increase in the number of amicus briefs filed
from the late 1940s to the late 1990s-an increase of over 800%.92 Al-
exandra Dunworth, Joshua Fischman, and Daniel Ho then documented a
continual increase in recent years. In their study of Supreme Court ami-
cus briefs from 1978 to 2006, they noticed that "[d]espite a decrease in
[the Court's] caseload around 1990, the number of amicus briefs (per
case and overall) steadily increase[d]." 93 More specifically, the last 50
years has also seen an increase in the number of briefs filed presenting
the Court with social science data.94 And, by my count, 78% of the cases
decided in the 2012-2013 Term had an amicus participate who brought
a factual authority to the Court's attention, be it medical, historical, or
social science.
Why are there so many factual amici today? Perhaps the answer is
that the Court seems more responsive to amici generally-citing amicus
90 David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical
Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 541, 545-46 (1991).
91 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.92 Keamey & Merrill, supra note 1; see also Owens & Epstein, supra note 19, at 127 (not-
ing an increased reception to amici during the Rehnquist Court era); Spriggs & Wahlbeck,
supra note 6, at 373 (demonstrating that approximately 67% of amicus briefs they studied
tendered arguments not contained in the party brief, but noting that amici often repeat party
arguments as well).
3 Alexandra Dunworth, Joshua Fischman & Daniel E. Ho, Policy Voting: What Amici
Tell Us About Law 7 (Oct. 30, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
htt://dho.stanford.edu/research/amici.pdf.
4 Alger & Krislov, supra note 11, at 504-05 ("Since the seminal Brown v. Board of Edu-
cation decision, social science has expanded its reach in Supreme Court filings and frequent-
ly social scientists have submitted amicus briefs." (citation omitted)); Ronald Roesch, Ste-
phen L. Golding, Valerie P. Hans & N. Dickon Reppucci, Social Science and the Courts:
The Role of Amicus Curiae Briefs, 15 Law & Hum. Behav. 1, 1-2 (1991) ("Social scientists
have become increasingly involved in the submission of amicus curiae or 'friend of the
court' briefs to the courts.").
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briefs at a higher rate than ever before.95 Linda Greenhouse has specu-
lated that the Rehnquist Court, at least, was particularly attentive to nov-
el arguments from amici (particularly those represented by skilled law-
yers) due to concerns about "its own institutional legitimacy in the wake
of Bush v. Gore.,96 Others have suggested that referencing amici is a
"strategic move, designed to draw the attention of the (relatively) cen-
trist Anthony Kennedy" who seems more inclined than others to look to
third-party briefs. 97
I think, however, the rise of amici who present factual data to the
Court has more to do with a global change in the way we all process and
expect information. It is hard to overstate the degree of change that
technology has brought to the law in the past 15 years. As Barbara Bint-
liff puts it, "[T]he computer's impact on law is conceivably greater and
more fundamental than almost any other development of the last hun-
dred years.""
With the dawn of the digital age and the tremendous amount of in-
formation available to access instantly, arguments are changing-and
the arguments in judicial opinions and legal briefs are no exception.
Consider a casual debate with a friend over access to violent video
games. Before the Internet, one might make general references to a risk
of brain damage in children or increased violence in our society-but
without empirical support. Now, however, such support can be accessed
with a click of the mouse (or even a swipe on a phone). With that ease of
access comes a new expectation-a hunger for empirical support in fac-
tual claims about the world.
American culture has always equated science with legitimacy, 99 but
the Internet makes that intuition more pronounced and the effects be-
come more visible. Modem audiences, in other words, demand authori-
ties supporting factual observations. These authorities-be they studies
95 Kearney & Merrill, supra note 1, at 757 (looking at all of the references to amicus briefs
from 1946 to 1995 and concluding that "[t]here is no question but that the total number of
references to amici is substantial, and that the frequency of such references has been increas-
ing over time"); see also Owens & Epstein, supra note 19, at 130 (noting that the rise in cita-
tion to amicus briefs in the Rehnquist Court years was "astonishingly high").
96 Owens & Epstein, supra note 19, at 128 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Linda Greenhouse, What Got into the Court? What Happens Next?, 57
Me. L. Rev. 1, 10 (2005)).
9' Id. at 131.
98 Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking like a Lawyer in the Com-
puter Age, 88 Law Libr. J. 338, 339 (1996).
99 Tai, supra note 11, at 796-97.
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or statistics or just amicus briefs-essentially communicate: "I am not
making this up."' 00 Perhaps living in a world where information is so
freely available means people insist on those authorities for statements
of fact to a new degree.
This may partially explain why others have observed an increase in
empiricism on the Court and an increase in citation to non-legal authori-
ties.' 1 In Roe v. Wade, for example, the Court asserted without citation
that "[m]aternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future .... Mental and physical health may be taxed
by child care."'0 2 The Court just left it at that. By contrast, in the 2007
Gonzales v. Carhart decision, Justice Ginsburg in dissent made a similar
observation and followed it with 10 citations to fact-based authorities-
from medical journals to New York Times articles to briefs from the
American Psychological Association. 0 3 Supreme Court Justices, like the
rest of us, seem to be craving more factual information, and the amicus
briefs are stepping in to fill the void.
B. Recent Trends in the Court's Citation to Amicus Briefs
Not only has amicus participation increased, but the past several dec-
ades have also brought a dramatic upswing in citation to amicus briefs in
100 Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 Va. L. Rev. 1931, 1950 (2008) [here-
inafter Schauer, Authority and Authorities] (internal quotation marks omitted) (attributing
the line to humorist Dave Barry and making the connection to legal authorities).
101 Timothy Zick, Constitutional Empiricism: Quasi-neutral Principles and Constitutional
Truths, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 115 (2003); see also Tracey L. Meares, Three Objections to the Use
of Empiricism in Criminal Law and Procedure-And Three Answers, 2002 U. Ill. L. Rev.
851, 851 (explaining that "over the past decade, judges and lawyers have begun to cite to
empirical studies in their work with increasing regularity"); John Monahan & Laurens Walk-
er, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 477, 477 (1986) ("Once heretical, the belief that empirical studies can influence
the content of legal doctrine is now one of the few points of general agreement among ju-
rists."); Rachael N. Pine, Speculation and Reality: The Role of Facts in Judicial Protection of
Fundamental Rights, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev. 655, 658-68 (1988) (providing a historical account
of the use of facts in judicial opinions); Frederick Schauer & Virginia J. Wise, Nonlegal In-
formation and the Delegalization of Law, 29 J. Legal Stud. 495, 497-98 (2000) (document-
ing the rise of non-legal authorities in Supreme Court opinions); cf. Ellie Margolis, Authori-
ty Without Borders: The World Wide Web and the Delegalization of Law, 41 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 909, 911-12 (2011) (observing how the digital revolution has "blurr[ed] . . . the line
between legal and nonlegal authority" in recent judicial opinions).102410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
103 550 U.S. 124, 183 n.7 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court opinions." 4 As Professors Ryan Owens and Lee Epstein
have documented, "When the opportunity arises to cite an amicus curiae
brief, which it now does in about nine out of every ten cases..., ma-
jority opinion writers often take advantage of it."1°5 During the
Rehnquist Court, in fact, Owens and Epstein observed that majority
opinions "referenced at least one amicus in 38 percent of the 687 cases
in which one or more friends participated," and the rate surpassed 40%
in 2002 and 2003.106 "Relative to earlier years," they explain, "this is an
astonishingly high figure. 10 7
But how often are these growing amicus brief citations used to sup-
port assertions of fact? I took a look at every citation to an amicus brief
in a Supreme Court opinion from the last five years. By my count, there
have been 606 citations to amicus briefs in the 417 Supreme Court opin-
ions decided from 2008 to 2013.08 Of those 606 citations, 124 of
them--or roughly 20 0/--were citations to amicus briefs to support as-
sertions of legislative fact.
A close look at those 124 factual citations reveals some surprising
patterns (reflected in the chart attached in the Appendix to this Article).
First, relying on amicus expertise on factual matters is not a trend domi-
nated by any particular Justice, any particular ideology, or any particular
brand of fact. I found citations to amicus expertise on factual matters by
eleven different Justices during this five-year period.
It is also not the case that these citations relate to just one narrow sci-
entific subject matter. Justice Alito relied on an amicus brief from the
New York County District Attorney's Office to assert that numerous lab
technicians routinely have their hands on DNA evidence. 10 9 Justice So-
tomayor relied on a brief from an economics professor to establish the
average length of time of a Chapter 12 bankruptcy.10 And, in the chal-
lenge to the Affordable Care Act in 2012, Chief Justice Roberts relied
on a brief from "America's Health Insurance Plans" to assert that the
104 See Owens & Epstein, supra note 19, at 128 ("By 1971, for the first time in the Court's
history, one or more amici appeared in a majority of its cases (56 percent). Since the 1970s
that percentage has steadily increased with time-to the point where it is now the rare case in
which at least one amicus does not file.").
105 Id. at 130.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 This number includes all opinions (majority, dissenting, and concurring).
109 Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2244 (2012).
110 Hall v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 1882, 1900 (2012).
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new law "will lead insurers to significantly increase premiums on every-
one."
111
These citations come from dissents, concurrences, and also majority
opinions-indeed 75 of the 124 citations came from an opinion for the
Court. Also of interest, as noted above, less than a third of the amicus
factual claims that make it into the opinions were actually contested in
the party briefs-only 35 out of 124 (or 28%) generated a response from
a party.
112
Perhaps most surprising of all, however, is what I did not find. More
often than not a Justice citing an amicus brief to support a factual claim
relies on only the amicus brief as authority without accompanying evi-
dence (studies, articles, statistics, etc.) that can be found from within the
brief. In fact, 61% of the time (76 of the 124), a citation to an amicus
brief rests alone-without a "see also" cite and without a parenthetical
highlighting the source of the evidence that may or may not be contained
in the brief.
This practice indicates that the Justices treat amici as experts, not as a
research tool. So, for example, when discussing the constitutionality of
strip searches under the Fourth Amendment, the Court cites a brief for
the National Association of Social Workers to support the claim that
such searches result in "serious emotional damage."' 13 And, in a case
challenging the federal ban on providing material support to designated
terrorist groups, the Court cites a brief from the Anti-Defamation
League ("ADL") to describe the activities of terrorist group fundraising
and to support the claim that "[f]unds raised ostensibly for charitable
purposes have in the past been redirected by some terrorist groups to
fund the purchase of arms and explosives."
' 4
This robust practice of amici expertise on factual matters is not only
new but is also unique to the U.S. Supreme Court. For the sake of com-
parison, I also looked at citation rates to amicus briefs for factual claims
in the 50 state supreme courts. In the same five-year time period (2008-
111 Nat'l Fed'n of indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585 (2012).
112 My search for party rebuttal included not just searching for the amicus by name, but
also for key words surrounding its factual claim.
113 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 375 (2009) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
114 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 31 (2010) (alteration in original) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
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2013), there were only 56 citations to amicus briefs for factual claims in
all 50 states, compared to 124 in the U.S. Supreme Court.
Of course it cannot be denied that state supreme courts do not receive
the same number of amicus briefs as their brethren Justices on the U.S.
Supreme Court. But amicus participation in the state supreme courts is
also increasing," 15 and even for those state supreme courts that do cite to
amicus briefs frequently-like Pennsylvania, Washington, and New Jer-
sey-it was very rare to find such a citation to support a claim of fact.
Of the 52 citations to amicus briefs from the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, for example, only once was a brief used to support a statement of
fact. 1
16
C. The Significance ofAmicus Citations
Why does a citation count like this matter? It is impossible, of course,
to identify the influence any study, brief, or piece of evidence has on a
judge or justice. Political scientists, in fact, generally struggle to meas-
ure the influence amicus briefs have on judicial decisions in general. The
typical strategy is to compare amicus participation with case outcome
and to track correlations between having amici support and winning
one's case.
117
But as Professor Paul Collins and colleagues suggest in a fascinating
new article, tracking case outcomes seems an inadequate measure be-
cause it fails to "address the content of the Court's opinions, which is the
most significant means by which the Court contributes to legal and so-
cial policy.""' 8 Collins used new plagiarism detection software to assess
whether language used in amicus briefs later turned up in majority opin-
ions. He and his colleagues found that indeed "the justices systematical-
ly incorporate language from amicus briefs into the Court's majority
115 Jenna L. Becker Kane, Measuring the Influence of Amici in State Supreme Courts 21-
22 (Am. Political Sci. Ass'n Annual Meeting Paper, 2013), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2300527 (observing rise of amici in state supreme courts).
6 See Fross v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 20 A.3d 1193, 1201 n.10 (Pa. 2011) (citing a brief for
the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers about the significant effect of residency
restrictions). Similarly, in New Jersey there were 45 citations to amicus briefs generally and
only 2 were to support statements of fact. In Washington there were 74 citations to amicus
briefs generally and only 15 of them were to support statements of fact.
117 Collins et al., supra note 21, at 1 ("Though there has been no shortage of research on
friends of the court, scholars have overwhelmingly examined the ability of amici to influence
case outcomes or the justices' voting behavior in those cases.").
118 Id.
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opinions"-particularly language from the Solicitor General and other
"high quality amicus briefs" (coded for cognitive clarity and use of plain
language). I'"
Both the results of this new study and my own observations on cita-
tion practice indicate that the Justices are reading and incorporating ar-
guments from amici into their opinions. But the question remains, why
should that matter? Some people believe that the Justices decide how
they want the case to come out first and then use the facts as mere "win-
dow dressing.'' 2 ° Professor Dan Kahan's recent work on how deep-
seated values undermine the way we process facts (and even math) sup-
ports this intuition. 2' On this view, it does not really matter how the Jus-
tices find their facts; who cares if they find data from amicus briefs or
just make it up if it is not going to affect the outcome in any event?
I resist the temptation, however, to ignore the reasons the Justices
provide as explanation for their decisions. Authorities matter in the
law-regardless of outcome. Fred Schauer has explained, "[T]he law's
practice of using and announcing its authorities ... is part and parcel of
law's character."'22 Or, as Professor Frank Cross and colleagues put it
recently, "Citations function something like the currency of the legal
system."' 2 3 To me, the Court's use of factual authorities generally (and
amicus authorities specifically) is relevant and significant for at least
three practical reasons.
For one, as I have observed before, a factual statement in a Supreme
Court opinion today can easily drift over to a new context and make an
1 1 Id. at 14, 21-22.
120 See Brian Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against "Nonsense" Jurisprudence), 100
Geo. L.J. 865, 885 (2012) ("After all, if we were all Dworkinian Moralists, then we would
take every judicial opinion at face value and never inquire into the politics or the individual
or group psychology of the decisions, as Realists like Posner, Llewellyn, and the contempo-
rary political scientists do. We would only ask about the theory of justificatory ascent that
supports the decision and never entertain the hypothesis that the best way to make sense of
what judges like Cardozo or tribunals like the U.S. Supreme Court are really doing is that
they are making decisions on nonlegal grounds and then offering legalistic window dressing
for those quasi-legislative decisions.").
121 See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term-Foreword: Neutral Principles,
Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 34-
36 (2011); Dan M. Kahan et al., Motivated Numeracy and Enlightened Self-Government 6,
25 (Yale Law Sch. Cultural Cognition Project, Working Paper No. 116, 2013), available at
http:/ssm/abract=2319992.
2 Schauer, Authority and Authorities, supra note 100, at 1935.
123 Frank B. Cross et al., Citations in the U.S. Supreme Court: An Empirical Study of Their
Use and Significance, 2010 U. I11. L. Rev. 489,490.
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appearance in a subsequent lower court opinion-affecting new parties
and creating new law.124 For example, studies on juvenile brain devel-
opment presented by an amicus and blessed by a Justice in a case debat-
ing age restrictions on abortions can be found later in a state supreme
court opinion upholding juvenile criminal penalties. 2 5 The importation
of factual claims from one context to another is an example of the signif-
icance such claims carry in the first place.
Second, the U.S. Reports are full of examples of legislative facts that
seem outcome determinative, or at least that would make the outcome
more difficult to sustain if revised. Sometimes, for example, the Court's
legal rules seem premised on factual claims. As is well known, the ami-
cus-presented social science data on educational benefits of racial diver-
sity played a prominent role in Grutter v. Bollinger-so much so that
Justice O'Connor referenced the brief in her oral announcement of the
affirmative action decision from the bench. And in Gonzales v. Raich,
the principal question in the case-whether Congress could regulate
homegrown marijuana-turned almost entirely on the factual question of
whether the larger marijuana market would be affected. 126
Attempting to measure whether the Justices cite amicus briefs for
facts that matter is an exceedingly difficult endeavor. For a conservative
estimate, however, I went through these 124 citations to amicus briefs
for facts and identified the ones that are used to answer outcome-
determinative questions-meaning the ones that the Justices use to an-
swer a question they must address to resolve the case. I attempted, in
other words, to screen out the "window dressing" facts used by the Jus-
tices just to tell a narrative.
Of the 124 citations to amicus briefs for factual claims, I counted 97
of them that were used to answer what I have described as outcome-
determinative questions. 127 This demonstrates that a significant number
124 See examples gathered in Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 2, at 81-97.
125 Brief for American Psychological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners
at 18-19, Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990) (Nos. 88-1125, 88-1309), cited in
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 617-18 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's ref-
erence to the amicus brief is then cited in State v. Ninham, 797 N.W.2d 451, 473 (Wis.
2011). See Larsen, Factual Precedents, supra note 2, at 81-82, for discussion of this example
and others.
126 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005). For an in-depth discussion of facts that are
used to form and apply constitutional rules, see Faigman, supra note 2, at 46-62.
127 As mentioned, what is or is not outcome determinative is highly subjective and thus
subject to possibly random variation in practice. Of three readers to go through the citations
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of these citations are central to the Justice's explanation for his or her
decision. Even if it would be possible to work around inconvenient facts
to preserve desired outcomes, it would presumably be more costly for
the Justices to do so (politically, ideologically, and psychologically).
Finally, even if one is skeptical that the Court's fact finding affects
the case outcomes, the authorities the Justices use can still carry inde-
pendent political consequences. In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Court's de-
cision on partial birth abortion, Justice Kennedy cited an amicus brief to
support the claim that women may regret their abortions later.128 The tes-
timony collected in this brief was gathered by a group called Operation
Outcry. As Professor Reva Siegel observes, before 2007, Operation Out-
cry had been hard at work without much success promoting the "wom-
an-protective antiabortion" theory-the belief that women are harmed
by permissive abortions and that abortions should be banned for that
reason.129 Following the decision in Carhart, the group announced tri-
umphantly on their website that "the Supreme Court is listening!'
30
Siegel, in fact, credits Justice Kennedy's citation to this amicus brief
with a resurgence in this aspect of the anti-abortion political move-
ment.
131
I do not believe in a pure fact-finding process at the Court where the
Justices canvass all possible factual authorities and decide the cases
solely based on the best available evidence. But nonetheless I still be-
lieve that the authorities they choose to cite are significant and have real
consequences both inside and outside the Supreme Court building. It
thus becomes relevant where that information comes from, and specifi-
cally whether the amicus process is a good place to find it.
and holdings of the relevant cases, however, even the most conservative found 75 of the 124
citations (over half to be used to answer a question she deemed outcome determinative.
128 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
129 Siegel, Politics of Protection, supra note 78, at 1726 (explaining that woman-protective
anti-abortion theory proponents assert that "women will be harmed by abortion"); see also
id. at 1727 n.95 (documenting Operation Outcry's efforts).
130 Id. at 1734 n. 114.
131 Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Wom-
an-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 Duke L.J. 1641, 1648 (2008) [hereinafter Siegel,
The Right's Reasons] ("Until the Court's decision in Carhart, the rise of gender-based antia-
bortion arguments was barely noticed in the mainstream press or by scholars outside the pub-
lic health field.").
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II. SUBSTANCE-BASED OBJECTIONS TO AMIcus EXPERTISE
Since the Justices are relying on amici as experts-routinely citing
their "testimony" (the briefs) alone without more-it becomes more im-
portant to investigate the quality of this testimony. Put differently,
would this extra-record evidence hold up on cross-examination had it
come in at trial?
After digging into amicus briefs that present factual information to the
Court, I am convinced the answer to that question in many instances is
no. It should come as no surprise that amicus briefs are more aggressive
or perhaps more creative with their factual claims than are judicial opin-
ions. As Dan Ho and colleagues recently observed, amici are generally
more policy motivated than the Justices. 132 Most political scientists agree
that amici engage in "partisan advocacy of specific positions" and "ar-
gue their positions for the primary purpose of shaping the Court's policy
output.'
133
What this means, of course, is that the factual data amici present to
the Court and the studies they choose to highlight are all funneled
through an advocacy sieve. The cost of such advocate fact gathering is
periodic unreliability. Several troubling patterns emerge and are de-
scribed below.
A. Amici Citing No Source or a Source Not Publicly Available
If all amicus briefs were citing reputable peer-reviewed scientific
journals or statistics from the State Department to support their factual
claims, we should not care that much if the Justices are citing to the
briefs themselves or to the authorities presented by the amici. To be
sure, some amici do cite very reliable peer-reviewed studies and the like
to support their assertions of fact. It turns out, however, that this is not
universally true.
The worst offenders, I think, are the amici who make a factual
claim-numbers gleaned from a survey for example-and then drop a
footnote to explain that the actual results are not in a published study, or
even posted on the organization's website, but are simply "on file with"
the amicus. Amicus briefs filed in the 2012-2013 Term alone are full of
132 See Dunworth et al., supra note 93, at 20-21.
133 Id. at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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examples. 3 4 Social scientists supporting Hollingsworth in the Proposi-
tion 8 case, for instance, filed data supposedly culled from the Canadian
census to support the claim that children of gay and lesbian couples are
less likely to finish high school. 13 5 This study is "on file with" the au-
thors and not available publicly.
One may be tempted to assume such opaque factual authorities will
be ignored by the Justices who have incentives not to embarrass them-
selves with unreliable claims. That assumption, however, would be
false. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court had to determine
if the U.S. Constitution was violated when a state judge refused to recu-
se himself from participation in a case where one of the parties had spent
$3 million in support of the judge's election campaign. 3 6 In dissent, ar-
guing that this situation did not offend due process, Chief Justice Rob-
erts cites an amicus brief for numerous "examples of judicial elections in
which independent expenditures backfired and hurt the candidate's cam-
paign." '137 The amicus brief cites a law review article for the fact, which,
in turn, cites an e-mail from a state judge that is only "on file with the
author."'
138
Likewise, in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, a case about
routine prison strip searches, many of the factual claims referenced by
Justice Kennedy with a cite to an amicus brief are not in fact accompa-
nied by any supporting authority once one actually opens the brief. The
134 See, e.g., Brief of Social Science Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Hol-
lingsworth and Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group Addressing the Merits and Supporting Re-
versal at 23, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (No. 12-144), United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307) [hereinafter Brief of Social Science Profes-
sors] (using data that come from a study not publicly available); Brief of Houston Communi-
ty College System as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 5 n.8, Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345) (citing "Office of Institutional Research,
Houston Community College System, Transfers to 4 Year Institutions by Academic Year
and by Ethnicity (Jul. 31, 2012) (on file with author)").
135 Brief of Social Science Professors, supra note 134, at 23-24 (citing Douglas W. Allen,
High School Graduation Rates Among Children of Same-Sex Households 4 (2012) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with the Department of Economics, Simon Fraser Universi-
ty)).
t36 556 U.S. 868, 872 (2009).
137 Id. at 901 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
38 Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 27 n.50, Caperton, 556 U.S. 868 (No. 08-22) (citing Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups
and Judicial Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1391, 1404 n.66 (2001)). Champagne's footnote
then references an "E-mail from Rhoda Billings to Anthony Champagne, (Oct. 16, 2000) (on
file with author)."
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increasing number of gang fights, for example, is just baldly asserted in
the brief for the Policemen's Benevolent Association with the preface
"[t]here is no doubt.' 39 And the claim that strip searching is necessary
because of dangerous goods smuggled into prison in body cavities
comes from a brief filed by the City of San Francisco which, in turn,
cites a dissent from a decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, which actually cites anecdotal stories gleaned from an amicus
brief, not available online.
140
Similarly when NASA employees challenged background checks as a
violation of their constitutional privacy rights, Justice Alito, writing for
the majority, rejected their claim in part because "millions of private
employers" use background checks just like the ones in question. 41 For
support he cites a brief filed for the Consumer Data Industry Associa-
tion, which asserts in its self-description ("statement of interest") that its
clients are among the "88% of U.S. companies that perform background
checks on their employees.' 42 Where this number comes from is a mys-
tery. It is asserted in the brief without citation. And indeed at least one
other publicly available survey puts that number at significantly lower
than 88%.1
41
139 Brief of Policemen's Benevolent Ass'n, Local 249 et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 14, Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (2012) (No. 10-
945) ("There is no doubt that gangs are becoming increasingly prevalent in correctional fa-
cilities throughout the Country."). Justice Kennedy cites this brief for that fact in Florence,
132 S. Ct. at 1518.
140 Brief of City and County of San Francisco et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents at 10, Florence, 132 S. Ct. 1510 (No. 10-945), cited in Florence, 132 S. Ct. at
1519. This brief cites to the dissent in a Ninth Circuit opinion. See Bull v. City & Cnty. of
San Francisco, 539 F.3d 1193, 1211 (9th Cir. 2008) (Tallman, J., dissenting) (citing an ami-
cus brief from San Mateo County Sheriff Don Horsely and the County of San Mateo that is
not available online).
141 NASA v. Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746, 758 (2011).142 Brief of Consumer Data Industry Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners
at 2, Nelson, 131 S. Ct. 746 (No. 09-530).
1431 make no assertion, of course, as to what the correct statistic may actually be. My point
is only that the factual claim is contestable. The Society for Human Resource Management,
for example, does a survey of U.S. companies every year where it obtains information on
employer background checks and a variety of other human resource topics. The organization
claims the number in question is less than 88%. For criminal background checks, see Back-
ground Checking-The Use of Criminal Background Checks in Hiring Decisions, Soc'y for
Human Res. Mgmt. (July 19, 2012), http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/
Articles/Pages/CriminalBackgroundCheck.aspx. It seems odd in light of that uncertainty to
cite an amicus brief for a statistic that does not include a publicly available source for the
number it provides.
Trouble with Amicus Facts
Lest one think this "take their word for it" practice is only committed
by fringe-players, the Solicitor General of the United States-the most
influential amicus out there-has also made unsupported factual asser-
tions (later proved erroneous) that have ultimately found their way into
the U.S. Reports. In her recent article on the subject, Professor Nancy
Morawetz describes what she calls a disturbing trend of the Solicitor
General ("SG") making unsupported factual assertions to the Court
about internal government operations that are not part of the record or
publicly available. 144
Her principal example of the disturbing consequences that can come
from this practice is the story of what happened in a case called Nken v.
Holder.145 Nken was an immigration case about whether a non-citizen's
removal from the country constituted irreparable injury requiring a stay
pending appeal.146 In its brief to the Court, the SG stated that it was the
government's "policy and practice" to "facilitat[e]" an alien's return to
the United States if he ended up winning his case on appeal. 147 This
statement was later cited by Chief Justice Roberts in his majority opin-
ion for the Court ruling that removal was not irreparable harm. 148 The
description of the policy came as a surprise to immigration attorneys
who had clients unable to return to this country even after winning their
cases. Some of these attorneys (headed by Professor Morawetz, who
runs an immigrant rights clinic at NYU Law), filed a Freedom of Infor-
mation Act ("FOIA") request to the SG's Office seeking the basis for
their factual assertion to the Court.
Over the course of this FOIA litigation-and after the SG was or-
dered by a court to turn over internal e-mails-the SG's Office wrote to
the Supreme Court to correct its statement in the Nken brief and concede
that there was no such uniform practice facilitating the return of deport-
ed non-citizens who won their appeals. As Morawetz says, however,
"[T]he damage was done. The language in Nken was on the books, and
44 Nancy Morawetz, Convenient Facts: Nken v. Holder, the Solicitor General, and the
Presentation of Internal Government Facts, 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1600 (2013).
145 556 U.S. 418 (2009).
146 Id. at 422.
147 Brief for the Respondent at 44, Nken, 556 U.S. 418 (No. 08-681).
148Nken, 556 U.S. at 435.
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lower courts had already revised caselaw about stays in light of the Su-
,,149preme Court's pronouncement.
Morawetz recognizes the SG's well-earned reputation for producing
"high quality briefs,"'5 ° but she claims that the SG's Office also has "a
history of using its position to inject specific factual claims that appear
to be supplied by government agencies"'' but are not publicly availa-
ble. 52 It "repeatedly [tells] the Court that it has been 'advised' of facts
that are relevant to a case.' 53 The moral of the Nken story, Morawetz
argues, is that the Solicitor General-like any good advocate-is too
tempted to include factual information to support his claims even if this
information has not been "thoroughly vetted."'' 54
One has to wonder if even the Solicitor General-sometimes called
the Tenth Justice and often applauded for its candor and balanced advo-
cacy-is tempted to use facts loosely in support of a legal claim, the
same must be true with at least equal force to other amici who are not as
constrained by a desire to keep a balanced reputation intact.
B. Amici Citing Sources Created in Anticipation of Litigation
A second concerning pattern of unreliability in amicus briefs is a
claim of fact followed by an authority that seems to have been created
for the purpose of the litigation at hand. Just as the Federal Rules of Ev-
idence discount business records created in anticipation of litigation be-
cause they seem unlikely to accurately reflect the regular course of busi-
ness, 55 factual authorities created for a cause and with a case in mind
lack an important credibility. The temptation to create one's own factual
authorities is one that has likely always existed for well-funded amici,
but it is aggravated now in the digital age with the new cheap and con-
venient method to publish data.
A classic example of this sort of fact manufacturing has arisen in con-
stitutional challenges to punitive damages awards-that is, empirical
149 Morawetz, supra note 144, at 1602. For discussion about this and other examples of
lower court reliance on Supreme Court statements of fact, see my prior work. Larsen, Factu-
al Precedents, supra note 2.
150 Morawetz, supra note 144, at 1653.
151 Id. at 1608.
152 Id. at 1608-10.
153 Id. at 1608.
154 Id. at 1612. She suggests full disclosure from the SG to the Court and the litigants about
the basis for its factual claims. Id. at 1657.
155 Fed. R. Evid. 803(6).
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claims that punitive damages awards have "exploded" in size. 15 6 Profes-
sors Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig warned of this trend in a 1993
article on "junk social science" in which they argued that "the empirical
findings presented to the Justices [by amici in these cases] have the aura
of social science but do not follow the scientific truth-seeking norms that
regulate valid research.'
57
Rustad and Koenig examined the data submitted by amici in three
high-profile punitive damages cases brought to the U.S. Supreme Court.
They did not find any "outright fabrications" in the briefs, but they did
discover "systematic misuse of empirical research."' 5 8 They noted sever-
al scientific examples of funny business, including "making normative
statements that appear to be empirically based, and quoting studies out
of context."' 9 Another observation these authors made in 1993, howev-
er, is particularly relevant now: They noticed that amici commonly
"produc[e] studies designed for advocacy purposes."160
For example, Rustad and Koenig discuss a popular study that exam-
ined punitive damages awards and their growth over time.16' The study
was financed by Texaco and authored by three Texaco employees and
two attorneys at King & Spalding. 62 It was then published as a working
paper by the Washington Legal Foundation in November 1992-the ex-
act same month that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in TXO Pro-
duction Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., a case that considered
whether a $10 million punitive damages award against an oil-and-gas
production company violated the Due Process Clause. 1
63
Despite the fishy timing, one cannot know for certain that the study
was commissioned in anticipation of litigation. But several amicus briefs
did present the Texaco study to the Court in that case-including one
authored by the Washington Legal Foundation (the same organization
that published the study in the first place).' 64 According to Rustad and
Koenig (a professor of law and a professor of sociology), the study suf-
156 See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 121 n.143.
157 Id. at 91.
I58 d. at 128.
"9 Id. at 100.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 144 (citing Stephen M. Turner et al., Punitive Damages Explosion: Fact or Fic-
tion? (Wash. Legal Found., Critical Legal Issues, Working Paper No. 50, 1992)).
162 Id. at 144 & n.262.
163 509 U.S. 443,446 (1993).
164 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 144 & n.263.
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fers from several methodological flaws and should be "of little or no
value to the Court." '165 Indeed, Rustad and Koenig "suspect that Texaco,
the firm that was assessed the largest punitive damages award ever paid,
has a strong bias against the remedy., 166 They warn generally against
"studies financed by a partisan source, with the results presented in a
manner that advances the purposes of the funding source. 167 The con-
flict of interest in such studies is inescapable.
Empirical studies like the Texaco one are expensive, and before the
dawn of the Internet it would be tempting to assume that only deep
pockets could afford to publish "working papers" conveniently present-
ing relevant facts on the eve of a major Supreme Court decision.
Times have changed, however. The Internet now presents a wide-
open forum for "working papers." It is theoretically possible for anyone
with an iPhone and an agenda to assemble data convenient to his policy
position and then post it to the world.
This reality is particularly salient given the rise of the Supreme Court
bar and the entrenched relationships between institutional amici and
their retained Supreme Court attorneys. As in the Texaco example just
discussed, an attorney in a Supreme Court practice can author a "work-
ing paper" supporting a favorable factual position for his or her institu-
tional client, and shortly thereafter that "working paper" will show up as
an authority in an amicus brief to the Court sponsored by the organiza-
tion and written by the law firm.
In fact, a quick look at the tables of authorities in the amicus briefs
filed in the 2012-2013 Term reveal that it is not at all rare for an amicus
to cite a study it funded or conducted itself. Examples include: the Ge-
neric Pharmaceutical Association presenting a study it sponsored on the
money saved through generic drugs,' 68 the National Venture Capital As-
165 Id. at 145. The authors point to three main flaws with the study. First, it "lumps all pu-
nitive damage awards assessed against businesses into a single category, making it impossi-
ble to pinpoint whether there is a problem in some particular substantive area," like asbestos
litigation. Second, it focuses only on states that are "hotspots" of business litigation, causing
a distortion in the total increase of punitive damages awards. Third, Texaco fails "to publish
any details beyond the total amount collected on appeal," therefore concealing any pattern of
growth in punitive damages. Id. at 144-45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
166 Id. at 145.
167 Id. at 143.
168 Brief for the Generic Pharmaceutical Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents
at 8-9, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416) (citing Generic Pharm.
Ass'n, Economic Analysis: Generic Pharmaceuticals 1999-2008: $734 Billion in Health
Care Savings (2009)).
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sociation describing a study it funded about how investment drives med-
ical innovation, 69 a statistical survey about the erosion of the crimi-
nal intent requirements in federal law, co-authored by an employee of
the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and then pre-
sented to the Court by the same organization.170
I have only demonstrated so far that amici are citing studies that seem
to be manufactured for litigation. The question remains whether any of
these studies actually get through to the Justices, or whether this is a lot
of effort by advocacy groups for no reason. It is important to recognize,
as mentioned above, that tracking citations to amicus briefs greatly un-
deremphasizes the influence such briefs may have. But even looking at
the times when a Justice will actually cite an amicus brief reveals exam-
ples of factual authorities that (circumstantial evidence strongly sug-
gests) were created in anticipation of the litigation.
Last Term the Court decided Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, in
which it confronted the "first sale doctrine" in copyright law, which
means that a copyright owner maintains control only on the first sale of
the copyrighted work.' The question in Kirtsaeng was whether there is
a geographic restriction on the first sale doctrine; it arose when a Thai
native studying in the United States was selling textbooks here that were
shipped to him from friends and family in Thailand.
Justice Breyer, delivering the majority opinion, cites a brief from the
American Library Association for the fact that "library collections con-
tain at least 200 million books published abroad."' 17 2 That number mat-
ters, of course, because it underscores the scope of the problem. Two
hundred million books disappearing from U.S. libraries seems like a
good reason to apply the first sale doctrine abroad. What is interesting
about this claim, though, is where that number comes from. The amicus
169 Brief of the National Venture Capital Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respond-
ent at 11, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) (No.
12-398) (citing Nat'l Venture Capital Ass'n, Patient Capital: How Venture Capital Invest-
ment Drives Revolutionary Medical Innovation (2007)).
170 Brief of the National Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioners Supporting Reversal at 15, Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714
(2013) (No. 11-8976) (citing Brian W. Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, Without Intent: How
Congress Is Eroding the Criminal Intent Requirement in Federal Law (2010), available at
htt://www.nacdl.org/WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=17613).
1 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1354-55 (2013).
172 Id. at 1364 (citing Brief of the American Library Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Petitioner at 4, 15-20, Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (No. 11-697)).
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brief cites to a blog post.17 3 The blog is called "Metalogue," and it is
principally dedicated to posts about metadata-which makes the post
about the number of foreign books in U.S. libraries seem a little out of
place.
The post in question comes from a person named Ed O'Neill who
works at the Online Computer Library Center ("OCLC"), a worldwide
library cooperative organization. His post begins, "OCLC was recently
asked to provide an estimate on the number of books held by US librar-
ies that were published outside of the United States."' 7 4 The blogger
does not specify who asked for the information, but it does not matter
anymore because the very next post after O'Neill's says the authors will
no longer be updating the blog. It ceased to exist after the litigation end-
ed.
O'Neill's blog post is dated June 24, 2010-less than a year after the
district court decision in Kirtsaeng that would eventually reach the Su-
preme Court. The timing could be a coincidence, but one is left to won-
der whether the people who asked for the blog post from Ed O'Neill did
so with an agenda in mind. At the very least, that is a question that
would have been asked of him had he presented his facts as an expert
witness subject to cross-examination.
Even if the idea of librarians blogging convenient facts for their cause
does not cause one to lose sleep at night, citation to biased factual au-
thorities posted on the Internet does not stop there. In 2010, the Supreme
Court decided Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project in which it rejected
a First Amendment challenge to a law that prohibits nonviolent "materi-
al support" to groups affiliated with designated terrorist organizations.'75
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts cites an amicus brief as
part of his support for the claim that "[flunds raised ostensibly for chari-
table purposes have in the past been redirected by some terrorist groups
173 Brief of the American Library Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
12, Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (No. 11-697) ("Cumulatively U.S. libraries hold an estimated
200 million copies of foreign published books. Posting of Ed O'Neill to Metalogue: New
Directions in Cataloguing and Metadata From Around the World,
http://community.oclc.org/metalogue/ (June 24, 2010, 8:29 AM).").
4 See Ed O'Neill, How Many "Foreign" Books Are in US Libraries?, Metalogue (June 24,
2010, 8:29 AM), https://web.archive.org/web/20110706155135/http://community.oclc.org/
metalogue/archives/2010/06/how-many-foreign-books-are-in.html (accessed through the
Wayback Machine). For an explanation of the Wayback Machine, see infra note 183.
175 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010).
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to fund the purchase of arms and explosives.' 176 The brief comes from
the Anti-Defamation League, a non-profit civil rights organization creat-
ed "to stop the defamation of the Jewish people and to secure justice and
fair treatment to all. 177
Digging into the brief, one discovers the ADL's principal support for
this claim comes from a series of "fact sheets" that it authored and pub-
lished on its own website178 The links provided for some of the fact
sheets in the amicus brief are now broken (perhaps alarming for its own
reason about the longevity of authorities relied on in Supreme Court de-
cisions),7 9 but archived versions can be found by researching the ADL
website 80
The ADL is a reputable organization that does important work, but it
cannot be denied that the interest group has a stake in the enforcement of
176 Id. at 2726 (alteration in original) (quoting the declaration of Kenneth R. McKune, an
official from the U.S. Department of State) (internal quotation marks omitted) (also citing
"Brief for Anti-Defamation League as Amicus Curiae 19-29 (describing fundraising activi-
ties by the PKK, LTTE, and Hamas)").
77 About the Anti-Defamation League, Anti-Defamation League, http://www.adl.org/
about-adl/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
178 Brief of the Anti-Defamation League as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 20,
22, 29, Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 08-1498). The brief cites three fact
sheets that the ADL wrote and posted; they discuss three different terrorist organizations.
See Hamas Fact Sheet, Anti-Defamation League (Jan. 30, 2006), http://archive.adl.org/
mainisrael/hamasfacts.htm; Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), Anti-Defamation League,
http://www.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/pkkl1.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2014); Liberation Ti-
gers of Tamil Eelam, Anti-Defamation League, http://archive.adl.org/terrorism/symbols/
liberationtigers-tel.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2014).
A careful reader will observe that the ADL brief also relies on a State Department report
about these terrorist organizations. The report, however, only supports the claim that these
terrorist groups-specifically the PKK-maintain a "large extortion, fundraising, and propa-
ganda network in Europe." See Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Dep't
of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2008, at 307 (2009), available at
www.state.gov/documents/organization/122599.pdf. The report does not mention money
funneled from charities, which is the proposition the ADL (and subsequently the Chief Jus-
tice) seems to use the report to support.
For other discussions about the longevity of web links in Supreme Court opinions, see
Raizel Liebler & June Liebert, Something Rotten in the State of Legal Citation: The Life
Span of a United States Supreme Court Citation Containing an Internet Link (1996-2010),
15 Yale J.L. & Tech. 273 (2013); Adam Liptak, In Supreme Court Opinions, Web Links to
Nowhere, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2013, at A13.
180 Of the three fact sheets, not all of them support the claim in the brief that money has
been re-routed from terrorist groups and used for violent purposes. The closest the PKK fact
sheet comes is the claim that the group "has extensive fundraising and propaganda opera-
tions throughout Europe, and often relies on violent crime for funding." Kurdistan Worker's
Party (PKK), supra note 178.
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this law. The ADL website brags that the group "[a]ctively lobbied" for
stronger laws to restrict support for terrorist groups.'18 Indeed, the Con-
gressional Record reflects this support. When introducing the bill that
ultimately resulted in the "material support" language in the Antiterror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Senator Orrin
Hatch said, "I was really pleased to see the help that we have had and
the positive work that we got from the Anti-Defamation League. They
deserve a lot of credit. They have been very, very concerned about
this."' 82
The ADL seems hardly a neutral expert to generate fact sheets on
whether charitable contributions to these groups actually do end up
funding violence. And the dates of these fact sheets (created while the
Ninth Circuit decision in the case was pending) open up the possibility
that these fact sheets were created with the Humanitarian Law Project
litigation in mind.18 3
181 Recalibrating the Balance Between National Security and Individual Rights, Anti-
Defamation League, http://archive.adl.org/Civil.Rights/national-security-and-individual-
rights.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). For an example of this lobbying, see Brief of the An-
ti-Defamation League as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees, Humanitarian
Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 98-56062). See also Recalibrating
the Balance Between National Security and Individual Rights, supra ("ADL supported en-
actment of the PATRIOT Act in October 2001 because we firmly believed that law enforce-
ment and intelligence officials needed additional tools to identify, track, and prosecute ter-
rorists and their supporters, and to prevent future attacks."); id. ("[ADL alctively lobbied for
strengthening America's anti-terror laws to enhance law enforcement's ability to prevent ter-
rorism and meet a real and present threat."); id. ("[ADL s]upported the ban on fundraising
for designated foreign terrorist organizations, enacted as part of the Anti-Terrorism and Ef-
fect [sic] Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), and has continued to file amicus briefs in
successful litigation supporting the constitutionality of those aspects of the AEDPA.").
182 142 Cong. Rec. S3363 (daily ed. Apr. 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). The
next day, April 17, he said, "In the fundraising provisions, I might add that the [Anti-
Defamation] League, and others of similar mind-and I am of similar mind-believe that
our fundraising language is far superior in this bill than it was in the Senate bill. I know it is
far superior .... As I have said, the Anti-Defamation League, AIPAC, and a whole raft of
others that are concerned in this area, like the language in this bill much better than the lan-
guage in the Senate bill." 142 Cong. Rec. S3459 (daily ed. Apr. 17, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Orrin Hatch).
183 Only one of the ADL fact sheets referenced in the brief is dated at all (the Hamas fact
sheet is dated January 2006), but some Internet sleuthing-specifically a program called the
Wayback Machine that takes snapshots of websites over time and allows a user to look at
archived versions of a website-reveals that the other two fact sheets date back to late No-
vember 2005. See Hamas Fact Sheet, supra note 178 (fact sheet dated January 30, 2006);
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), Anti-Defamation League, https://web.archive.org/
web/20130123121604/http://adl.org/terrorism/symbols/pkkl .asp (fact sheet archived by the
Wayback Machine on November 30, 2005); Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, Anti-
1794 [Vol. 100: 1757
Trouble with Amicus Facts
An important disclaimer is in order. To be sure, some legitimate sci-
entific research is funded by those with an interest in the results or is ini-
tiated because a forthcoming Supreme Court decision raises the issue's
salience. Just because the punitive damages study was funded by Tex-
aco, or the librarian blog post was solicited after litigation commenced,
or the terrorism claim from the ADL fact sheets was generated by a mo-
tivated interest group to support a law it lobbied to enact, does not mean
that these facts should be discredited per se.
But it is also hard to deny, as Rustad and Koenig put it over a decade
ago, that manufacturing research for litigation purposes results in factual
findings that are "designed to persuade rather than to inform the
Court.' 84 There is an unavoidable conflict of interest. Much like the dis-
count one gives to a corporate-sponsored "review" of a product adver-
tised online, supposedly neutral data should be given a skeptical eye
when it is motivated by those who are guided not by scientific objectivi-
ty but by "the ideology of advocacy." 185
C. Amici Citing Authorities with Minority Views in Their Field
A final noteworthy trend of factual claims in amicus briefs is the
presentation of an authority who holds a minority view in his field with-
out revealing the countervailing evidence. Again, a helpful way to con-
ceptualize this question is to contemplate whether this "testimony"
would survive cross-examination had it been entered at trial.
Gonzales v. Carhart-the Court's 2007 decision on partial birth abor-
tion-provides a controversial example. Writing for the majority and
acknowledging that he could "find no reliable data to measure the phe-
nomenon," Justice Kennedy wrote that "it seems unexceptionable to
conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life
Defamation League, https://web.archive.org/web/20130123121628/http://adl.org/terrorism/
symbols/liberationtigers-tel.asp (fact sheet archived by the Wayback Machine on Novem-
ber 28, 2005). Again, it could be a coincidence, but it seems possible that these fact sheets
were created with the Humanitarian Law Project litigation in mind. The district court deci-
sion enjoining the enforcement of the law (in part) was entered in July 2005, see Humanitar-
ian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2005), meaning that the fact
sheets were created and posted while the appeal to the Ninth Circuit was pending. This case
has a long and complicated twelve-year procedural history involving several trips to the
Ninth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit en banc. For a description of the highlights, see Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2714-16 (2010).
184 Rustad & Koenig, supra note 6, at 100.
185 Id.
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they once created and sustained .... Severe depression and loss of es-
teem can follow. ' 18 6 The authority he cites for this proposition is an ami-
cus brief filed by Sandra Cano, the "Mary Doe" in Doe v. Bolton,'87 and
180 women who alleged injuries from abortions. 88
The relevant pages of the Cano brief, in turn, rely on the work of Dr.
David Reardon to demonstrate what he claims are serious adverse psy-
chological consequences that accompany a decision to have an abor-
tion. 189 Dr. Reardon is a trained electrical engineer who holds a Ph.D. in
bioethics from an unaccredited and now non-existent school in Ha-
waii.1 90 He runs the "Elliot Institute," which is a non-profit organization
known for its anti-abortion advocacy. Since the early 1990s, Reardon
has sought to anchor the pro-life movement in arguments that speak in
terms of women's regret:
After all, in God's ordering of creation, it is only the mother who can
nurture her unborn child. All the rest of us can do is to nurture the
mother.
This, then, must be the centerpiece of our pro-woman/pro-life
agenda. The best interests of the child and the mother are always
joined-even if the mother does not initially realize it, and even if she
needs a tremendous amount of love and help to see it.' 9'
Dr. Reardon's research has been the subject of much controversy. His
work on the psychological harm caused by abortion has been consistent-
ly refuted by psychologists and psychiatrists, including groups such as
the American Psychological Association ("APA") and the American
186 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
187410 U.S. 179 (1973).
188 Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (citing Brief of Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 22-24, Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (No. 05-380)).
189 Brief of Sandra Cano et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 22, Carhart, 550
U.S. 124 (No. 05-380).
190 Pacific Western University folded in 2006 after Hawaii sued it for making misrepresen-
tations. See Press Release, Haw. Office of Consumer Prot., Pacific Western University (Ha-
waii) aka American PacWest International University (May 19, 2006), available at
http://archive.today/QQgS.
1 David C. Reardon, Politically Correct vs. Politically Smart: Why Politicians Should Be
Both Pro-Woman and Pro-Life, Post-Abortion Rev. (Elliot Inst., Springfield, Ill.), Fall 1994,
available at http://www.afterabortion.info/PARV2/n3/PROWOMAN.htm.
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Medical Association ("AMA"). 19 2 These psychologists have called
Reardon's work "misleading," and against the weight of the rest of the
work in the field.'93
The other pages of the Cano brief on which Justice Kennedy relies
collect the "testimony" of 180 women who have suffered emotionally
after an abortion. The affidavits presented by the amicus brief were orig-
inally collected by a group called "Operation Outcry" and are "sworn"
by virtue of a box checked on the group's website when the online sur-
vey is completed by the user. 194 As Reva Siegel and others have ob-
served, Operation Outcry has been hard at work promoting the woman-
protective anti-abortion theory.' 95 Siegel in fact credits Justice Kenne-
dy's citation to this amicus brief for a resurgence in this aspect of the an-
ti-abortion political movement. 196 It is particularly important, she ex-
plains, because Congress did not consider this woman-protective
rationale in passing the partial birth abortion law in question.' 97
To be sure, this is a debate in psychology that is particularly charged
politically. Regardless of how one feels politically on the subject, there
are two relevant points for now: (1) Dr. Reardon's research is a minority
view in the field of psychology, and (2) by crediting it with a citation,
192 For a collection of authorities criticizing Reardon's work, see Siegel, Politics of Protec-
tion, supra note 78, at 1719 n.81. See also Siegel, The Right's Reasons, supra note 131, at
1681 nn.130-32 (explaining the position of the APA and AMA).
193 See Brenda Major, Psychological Implications of Abortion-Highly Charged and Rife
with Misleading Research, 168 Can. Med. Ass'n J. 1257, 1257-58 (2003) ("[David Reardon
and his colleagues] report that subsequent psychiatric admission rates were higher for wom-
en who had an abortion than for those who delivered.... This conclusion is misleading....
It is inappropriate to imply from these data that abortion leads to subsequent psychiatric
problems.... The findings of Reardon and colleagues are inconsistent with a number of
well-designed earlier studies .... All of these studies concluded that the emotional well-
being of women who abort an unplanned pregnancy does not differ from that of women who
carry a pregnancy to term.").
9 Brief of Sandra Cano et al., supra note 189, at app. 11-106. The form in question is
available on Operation Outcry's website. Declaration: How My Abortion Affected Me, Op-
eration Outcry, http://www.operationoutcrystories.org/declaration (last visited Sept. 15,
2014). A user filling out the form is asked to check a box "authorizing" an amicus brief to be
filed on her behalf.
195 Siegel, The Right's Reasons, supra note 131, at 1642-47.
196 Id. at 1648, 1650-51.
197 Id. at 1642 & n.8.
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Justice Kennedy actually affected the research and reinvigorated this av-
enue of study.'
The Carhart example exposes a question that lurks in the background
of the entire amicus fact-finding process: Who should the Court trust to
represent science (or history, or statistics, or [fill in the blank])? Is the
Court limited to the experts whose testimony is in the record? Should the
Court evaluate on its own the methodologies of the scientific opinions
presented by amici? Should only the institutional organizations-the
American Psychological Association, the American Medical Associa-
tion, and so forth-be allowed to represent the position of a scientific
field as an amicus?
These questions are not merely theoretical. They animate a current
debate, for example, among sociologists following an amicus brief filed
in the 2011 Supreme Court case, Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes.199 Dukes
was a large class action lawsuit that claimed gender discrimination at
Wal-Mart. At trial the plaintiffs had hired an expert sociologist, Dr. Wil-
liam Bielby, to help establish commonality among the members of the
class. 200 Dr. Bielby used something called a "social framework analysis"
to assert that the organizational culture of Wal-Mart (largely the discre-
tionary and subjective features of its promotion policy) made the com-
pany particularly vulnerable to gender bias.20 ' Bielby's report (which of
course was contested by Wal-Mart at trial) was critical to the main issue
in the case-whether a large group of women over a vast geographic ar-
ea had enough common features to be certified as a class.20 2
What is interesting for present purposes is what happened after the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case. The American Sociological
Association ("ASA") filed an amicus brief backing up Dr. Bielby (who,
perhaps coincidentally, was a former president of the ASA).2 3 In its
' Id. at 1648 ("Until the Court's decision in Carhart, the rise of gender-based antiabor-
tion arguments was barely noticed in the mainstream press or by scholars outside the public
health field.").
199 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
20O Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 603 F.3d 571, 601 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining the district
court proceedings).
201 Id.
201 Id. at 601-03.
203 Brief of the American Sociological Ass'n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondents at 9, Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (No. 10-277); Profile of William T. Bielby, Am. So-
ciological Ass'n, http://www.asanet.org/about/presidents/WilliamBielby.cfm (last visited
Sept. 15, 2014).
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brief, the ASA assured the Court that Bielby's methods are commonly
used among sociologists generally.
This amicus brief stirred up a hornet's nest of controversy among so-
ciologists. 20 4 Some scholars, like Professor Christopher Winship, a soci-
ology professor at Harvard, and Professor John Monahan, a psychologist
and law professor at the University of Virginia, said that the ASA was
wrong.205 They claim Dr. Bielby went outside the field of sociology and
misused the social framework analysis (originally invented by Monahan
and his colleague Professor Laurens Walker) by applying it to a specific
context. When Bielby testified about Wal-Mart's specific policies, they
claim, "[he] made a conclusion that he had no basis to make. 20 6 Other
sociologists, like Professors Melissa Hart and Paul Secunda, support the
ASA brief and the use of social framework analysis in specific contexts
presented by litigation. They claim that Walker and Monahan "seem to
suggest that their coining of this phrase gives them a unique right to de-
fine the terms and content of expert testimony offered in employment
discrimination cases. 20 7
The interesting part of this dispute, to me, is that there is no uniform
"sociologist position" on a foundational question of sociologist method-
ology, that is, when the social framework analysis is appropriately used.
Reputable players in the field disagree. It is interesting to ask whether
institutional actors-like the ASA here or the APA in the Carhart ex-
ample-should have an umpiring role to play in their fields. One can
imagine institutional reasons the ASA may have for filing this brief-to
strengthen the role of social science in litigation, perhaps. Should that
bias disqualify it from claiming to be representative of the scientists in
the field?
Perhaps, then, the better alternative is to educate the Court as best we
can on all the positions in any field on any one question and let choosing
sides be a judicial prerogative. This, I think, may be too much to demand
204 For a good synopsis of the controversy, see Christopher Winship, What Is Required of
Science? The ASA Amicus Brief in Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 40 Soc. Methods & Res. 551, 555-
56 (2011).
205 John Monahan, Laurens Walker & Gregory Mitchell, Contextual Evidence of Gender
Discrimination: The Ascendance of "Social Frameworks," 94 Va. L. Rev. 1715, 1745 (2008)
("Dr. Bielby's testimony in Dukes departs from our conception of a social framework .... ").
206 Walker is quoted in the New York Times. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court to Weigh Soci-
ology Issue in Wal-Mart Discrimination Case, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 2011, at A17 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
207 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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from the judiciary, at least at the Supreme Court level. Consider once
again the impact of the Internet. A judicial quest for one scientific an-
swer to a question (if ever possible) is doomed from the start today. In
the 2012-2013 Term alone, nearly 80% of cases (61 out of 79) generat-
ed amicus briefs submitted at least in part to educate the Court on a fac-
208 latual question. In this large pool of information and with the time con-
straints of litigation, it is little wonder that the Court may credit a
minority view in a field without knowing it has done so.
Making things more challenging, many of these amicus briefs are also
"mismatched" from author to subject matter-meaning that a group who
is not an expert on the factual subject submits factual authorities to the
Court anyway. It is one thing to accept blog posts from librarians on the
number of particular types of books in libraries. It is quite another to ac-
cept psychological studies from an anti-abortion group on the risk of su-
icide in women who get an abortion. With this much information to
choose from and hundreds of motivated actors presenting it through an
advocacy lens, how is the Court supposed to discern minority views in a
scientific field from mainstream ones? If even the sociologists cannot
agree on what is "generally accepted" in their field, how can the Justices
sort it out for themselves?
D. Where Is the Check from the Adversary Method?
Traditionally, the answer to the questions I have been posing is to
point to the adversarial process as a check on amici. Amicus briefs (at
the merits stage) are due 7 days after the brief is filed for the side the
amici support (petitioner or respondent); the idea is for the respondent to
respond to the petitioner and petitioner's amici in his brief and to give
the petitioner the final say (in response to respondent and his amici) in
reply.20 9 Do not worry about unreliable studies or biased amicus authors,
the argument goes, because the parties have an opportunity to respond
and rebut them. While that answer may have been sufficient pre-1995,
the Internet changes the game. 10
208 A further layer of complication is that, in many fields, the amicus participation is un-
der-representative, meaning many important players do not file briefs to educate the Court.
See Tai, supra note 11, at 838.
209 See Sup. Ct. R. 37(3)(a).
210 Others agree that while fact finding outside party presentation is not new, the effect of
the Internet is a game-changer. See Schauer, Decline of "The Record," supra note 53, at 55-
1800 [Vol. 100: 1757
Trouble with Amicus Facts
As others have noted, "Legal information is transforming from a sta-
ble universe of settled sources into a free-for-all of competing authori-
ty. '  For Supreme Court advocates today, mastering "the record"
means endless Internet research. The Justices are often unpredictable in
terms of what factual questions will ultimately be important, and what
sources they will use to answer them.
Consider the odd strategic position of a Supreme Court advocate
when an amicus presents a shady factual authority to support the other
side. On the one hand, there is an instinct to rebut the authority and
counteract it with resources supporting your client's position. On the
other hand, drawing attention to that one amicus brief in a sea of amici
might be worse than ignoring it and hoping the needle gets lost in the
haystack. Particularly when one has limited words for briefing, and
without knowing whether the source will attract the Court's attention, it
may be too risky to spend ink on what you might consider to be a minor
issue from a fringe player.
Indeed, this strategic bind may explain why relatively few of the ami-
cus-provided facts that make it into Supreme Court opinions are contest-
ed by the parties. In my research, recall, there were 124 Court citations
to amicus briefs for factual claims in the last 5 years. I tracked the briefs
in those cases to see what sort of a check the adversary system provided.
Of those 124 factual claims, only 35 of them were contested in the briefs
by either party (28%), and only 33 of them were contested by another
amicus (approximately 25%). This is a surprisingly low rate of response
from the adversary system, which is supposed to provide a check on
faulty evidence.
This amicus factual information, remember, is presented to the Court
at the eleventh hour of litigation-after the record is closed and after the
experts have been called. The only check the adversarial system has left
to perform is in the Supreme Court briefing. The lowV rate of response for
these claims (among parties and other amici) indicates that the adversar-
ial system is not functioning as the sort of safety net we assume it will
be. Indeed, it is catching virtually nothing.
In another time, when amicus participation was low and legislative
facts were less important to the Court's decisions, it was perhaps per-
fectly reasonable to rely on the advocates to police the factual authorities
211 Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 Calif.
L. Rev. 1673, 1675 (2000).
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presented to the Court. Now, however, the amicus machine is too big,
and the field of possible authorities is too vast for the parties to be able
to keep up.
IV. PROCESS-BASED OBJECTIONS
The U.S. Supreme Court is the only American judicial entity that de-
pends so heavily on amicus briefs to educate itself on factual matters. In
a trial court, of course, assertions of fact typically come from experts
who are cross-examined and subject to the Daubert test for reliability.212
State supreme courts, interestingly, do not treat amicus briefs with the
same respect they are afforded in the U.S. Supreme Court. As noted
above, state courts cite amici at a significantly lower rate than does the
U.S. Supreme Court, and state amicus briefs are almost never cited for
factual claims.2"3 Lower federal courts are also not moved to consult
"expert amici" on questions of fact. As documented by Professor Linda
Sandstrom Simard, the citation counts are low even in the courts of ap-
peals, and surveys indicate most judges outside the Supreme Court find
this additional fact finding outside the record to be improper.214
The fact that the Supreme Court's modem amicus process is unique in
our judicial system should make us pause to consider why. The answer, I
think, involves changes in the Court's decision-making strategy and in-
stitutional objectives. These changes emphasize facts but de-emphasize
conventional fact-finding reliability checks. The combination of these
two developments is procedurally troubling.
The Supreme Court has made subtle changes in the way it operates
over the past ten years, and scholars have taken note. Put simply, the
shift is away from dispute resolution and towards law declaration.215 In
the words of Professor Henry Monaghan, the old adjudicatory model of
the Supreme Court-one that "focuses upon the actual dispute between
the litigants"-has been overtaken by an "emphasis ... on the judicial
role in saying what the law is, . . . not centered on the rights of the liti-
gants. 21 6 He notes several indicators of the shift, including the Court's
212 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
213 See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
214 Simard, supra note 6, at 686, 695.
215 See Neal Devins & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 859, 863 (2013); Henry Paul Monaghan, On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and
Related Matters, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 665, 680 (2012).
216 Monaghan, supra note 215, at 668.
Trouble with Amicus Facts
recent tendency to inject questions presented into a case, to use the party
stipulations strategically and reach the issues it wants to reach, and to
appoint an amicus to defend a judgment when the parties decline to do
so. Collectively, he says:
The Court is moving, not linearly, but noticeably, towards a juris-
prudence in which only a relaxed case or controversy doctrine, a
weakened final judgment rule, and the adequate and independent state
ground doctrine restrict the Court's authority to fully and effectively
superintend the judicial system on matters of federal law.2 17
This transformation, Monaghan says, is likely inevitable since "[t]he
Court's current place in our constitutional order distinguishes it in kind,
not in degree, from other courts."2 8 The Supreme Court is no traffic
court, he says; it stands at the intersection of law and politics in a way
that other courts do not.219
This shift in emphasis is also apparent in the Court's recent treatment
of legislative facts. As the Supreme Court shrinks the number of cases it
agrees to hear every year, there is an increased focus on generalized
facts as opposed to case-specific and record-specific ones. In her article
The Adversarial Myth, Brianne Gorod has noted this phenomenon and
spotted the tension between the Court's commitment to the adversary
process and its routine reliance on amicus briefs to answer questions of
fact.22 ° She argues that although courts "may tout the importance of ad-
versarialism and maintain that they rely on proper parties to develop the
factual record, courts often fail to practice what they preach., 21 Specifi-
cally, legislative facts are "let loose," she says, and have come to play an
increasingly vital role in the Supreme Court's decision making.222
By setting its own "agenda" (in Monaghan's words) 223 and abandon-
ing the "adversarial myth" (in Gorod's words),224 the Supreme Court has
217 Id. at 680-81.
218 Id. at 684.
219 Id. at 715, 720.
220 Gorod, supra note 2, at 37.
221 Id. at 25.
222 Id. at 40-43, 52-53. Gorod proposes "liberalizing standing doctrine when legislative
facts are at issue. If courts are going to turn to nonparties for help in resolving disputes of
legislative fact, it is better that they be brought into the process earlier so the factual claims
they offer can be rigorously tested." Id. at 2.
2 Monaghan, supra note 215.
224 Gorod, supra note 2.
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acquired a new freedom to shape the disputes it decides and to select the
evidence it uses to decide them. 25 In this way, the Court behaves some-
what like an administrative agency proceeding by notice-and-comment
rulemaking under Section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act: It
announces a notice of proposed rulemaking (the certiorari grant), lets in-
terested parties comment (by amicus briefs), and announces its decision
defended by a statement of basis and purpose (the opinion).
Professor Rebecca Haw has made this analogy explicitly in the con-
text of antitrust cases. She noticed that the Supreme Court was relying
on amicus briefs to supply economic information and economic reason-
ing necessary to interpret the Sherman Act.226 "[M]aking law under the
Sherman Act differs from deciding typical common law questions," she
says, and "demands technical and quantitative reasoning" the Justices
are ill-equipped to handle on their own.227 Filling the void are interested
amici; they advise the Court just like interested industry members make
comments to advise an administrative agency in rulemaking.228
To me, this comparison is not a flattering one. There are serious rea-
sons to fret about comparing the Supreme Court to an administrative
agency, particularly when it comes to fact finding. Agencies and courts
are created for different purposes, are designed to handle facts in differ-
ent ways, and derive their legitimacy from different sources.229
Agencies are creatures of statute, typically charged to blend adjudica-
tion with rulemaking powers. Legislative facts are thus essential to and
openly part of their mandate-their reason for existing. Indeed, recall
that the original use of the phrase "legislative fact" came from Kenneth
Culp Davis in a seminal article about administrative law. Davis named
225 For a corollary to this argument, see Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases per
Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of
Agency Action, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1094-95 (1987).
26 Haw, supra note 45.
227 Id. at 1248. Professor Haw's insight extends beyond the antitrust world she describes.
As documented above, the Court relies on amicus "experts" to answer all sorts of factual and
technical questions about the way the world works-from standard police practices to the
impact of copyright restrictions to questions of common terrorism ploys. See supra Part II.
Professor Haw suggests going all the way and creating an administrative agency to
make Sherman Act rules in the first place rather than relying on unreviewable amicus briefs.
Id. at 1249.
229 For a contrary position, see Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 6, at 965, 969 (arguing in
favor of educating generalist courts on highly technical matters in the spirit of notice-and-
comment rulemaking); id. at 987 (claiming that "amicus briefs have proven to be quite help-
ful" in this matter).
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these unique types of facts "legislative facts" because they relate to the
agency's legislative-like role: "The ingredients of all lawmaking have to
be policy ideas and facts, but the policy ideas are necessarily dependent,
immediately or remotely, on facts.
' 230
Administrative agencies and courts are set up to process legislative
facts in very different ways. To begin with, agencies are typically staffed
by people with expertise in the factual area (drugs, economics, environ-
mental toxins, and so forth) relevant to the decisions they are tasked
with reaching. Indeed, a principal justification for the very existence of
administrative agencies is that they inject factual expertise into policy
making in a way that legislators, acting alone, are unable to do.23'
Judges cannot provide this same expertise. American judges are gen-
eralists, appointed without regard to training outside the law.232 If a
judge has an outside familiarity with neuroscience, or endangered spe-
cies, or terrorism threats, or another type of relevant legislative fact that
aids him in resolving a dispute-that additional knowledge is pure coin-
cidence. Indeed, it may not be a happy one. Neutrality and the absence
of pre-existing bias is seen as a virtue of the judiciary: It ensures "[c]lear
heads" and "honest hearts," which Chief Justice Roberts recently re-
minded us are the very hallmarks of Article III judges. 233
Further, agencies and courts educate themselves on facts in very dif-
ferent ways. When an agency decides to take an action involving a legis-
lative fact (the long-term health effects of asbestosis, for example), it so-
licits reports and opinions from within and outside the industry it
regulates. The number of comments submitted to an agency while it con-
templates a rule varies considerably.234 Some proposed rules do not at-
tract many comments at all, but major rulemaking endeavors have gen-
erated over 100,000 comments, with various participants from
businesses and public interest groups. 235 By contrast, although amicus
230 Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in Lawmaking, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 931, 931 (1980); see also
Davis, supra note 2, at 402-03.
231 James M. Landis, The Administrative Process 23-24 (1938).
232 Frederick Schauer, The Dilemma of Ignorance: PGA Tour, Inc. v. Casey Martin, 2001
Sup. Ct. Rev. 267, 269.
Stem v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011) (alteration in original) (citation omit-
ted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
234 See Stephen M. Johnson, Beyond the Usual Suspects: ACUS, Rulemaking 2.0, and a
Vision for Broader, More Informed, and More Transparent Rulemaking, 65 Admin. L. Rev.
77, 82 (2013).
233 See id.
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submissions are up dramatically, the numbers pale in comparison to
comments that can be received by an administrative agency. The
healthcare decision in 2012 holds the record for the most amicus briefs
submitted ever in a Supreme Court case, but even that number was just
136.236
The Court and an agency also differ dramatically in the way they par-
ticipate in the evidence-gathering process. As factual evidence is submit-
ted to an agency during the comment period, the agency can be an active
participant in soliciting more information or shaping the inquiry going
forward. It can highlight the significance of a particular study and ask
for responses from others,237 it can revise the proposed rule (as long as it
does so publicly) in reaction to new information, and it can extend the
time for comments.238
A court, however, is necessarily reactive rather than proactive. As
Professors Neal Devins and Sai Prakash have argued, "Article III's em-
brace of the adversarial model is core to the judicial function., 239 It vio-
lates a norm for an American court to actually solicit a legal opinion or
to look beyond the factual record created by the parties. 24" Even when
courts are authorized to do it (for example, when authorized to appoint
expert witnesses on their own), "judges rarely do so for fear that such
appointments might 'inappropriately deprive the parties of control over
the presentation of a case."' 24
1
The agency also enjoys a luxury of time that the Court does not. The
length of time between a notice of proposed rulemaking and the ultimate
236 Greg Stohr, Record Number of Amicus Briefs Filed in Health Care Cases, Bloomberg
(Mar. 15, 2012, 12:55 PM), http://go.bloomberg.com/health-care-supreme-court/2012-03-
15/record-number-of-amicus-briefs-filed-in-health-care-cases.
237 See, e.g., Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Superior Cal. v. Norton, 247 F.3d 1241, 1245-46 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (noting that the agency relied on one particular environmental study and explain-
ing that "[t]he APA generally obliges an agency to publish for comment the technical studies
and data on which it relies").
238 Courts forbid an agency from adopting a rule that is not a "logical outgrowth" of the
proposed one, but in doing so they try to allow flexibility for the agency to adapt rules to
new information. See Phillip M. Kannan, The Logical Outgrowth Doctrine in Rulemaking,
48 Admin. L. Rev. 213, 214, 217 (1996). Agencies are generally permitted leeway to extend
the comment period when necessary. See Jeffrey Lubbers, A Guide to Federal Agency
Rulemaking 252 (5th ed. 2012) ("Even when a shorter comment period is allowed, the agen-
cy may extend the period for comment where a legitimate request for extension has been re-
ceived.").
239 Devins & Prakash, supra note 215, at 887.
240 Id. at 862.
241 Id. at 887.
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rule can vary (one recent study estimates the average is around a year
and a half), but the agency is not burdened by the time constraints of lit-
igation. It finishes its factual education when it wants to. The Court is
not so lucky. For example, when the Supreme Court decides to evaluate
neuroscience studies for the purposes of evaluating a First Amendment
challenge to a law banning violent video games for children, it operates
under a deadline-namely, the end of the Term in June.
These differences are even more stark when comparing agencies to
appellate courts (as opposed to district courts). In theory, at least, trial
courts are structured to admit evidence on facts relevant to the dispute.
Certainly this works well for adjudicative facts (What time did the vic-
tim die? What type of gun was used?), but it also works for generalized
legislative facts. Through competing expert witnesses, for example, and
strict standards on what evidence is admissible, trial courts educate
themselves on medicine, social science, and empirical data in a way that
still preserves the ability to spot holes and sniff out unreliability.
2 43
Appellate courts, however, are in a different position. Legislative
facts need not be established at trial. As I have explained, evidence on
these facts comes in through briefs at the very last minute of litigation.
When the Supreme Court uses amicus briefs in this way, it is bypassing
the procedural safeguards that exist at the trial level, and evaluating the
studies marshaled by the amici on its own, largely without even a check
from the parties and under a tight deadline.
One solution, therefore, to the problems highlighted in this paper is
for the Court to stop acting like an agency and to discipline itself from
relying on legislative facts so much. Arguably, the use of legislative
facts in the Supreme Court's decisions gives them the feel of objectivity
and pragmatic flexibility, but, as I hope I have demonstrated, that feel
can be an illusion.
242 See Lynn E. Blais & Wendy E. Wagner, Emerging Science, Adaptive Regulation, and
the Problem of Rulemaking Ruts, 86 Tex. L. Rev. 1701, 1708 (2008). There are a growing
number of voices in administrative law expressing concern about the clunkiness and "ossifi-
cation" of this fact-finding process. See Sidney Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Public Participa-
tion Without a Public: The Challenge for Administrative Policymaking, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 489,
499-500 (2013).
243 Justice Scalia has made this point before, arguing that factual development should oc-
cur in trial courts, and not in Supreme Court briefs: "An adversarial process in the trial
courts can identify flaws in the methodology of the studies that the parties put forward; here,
we accept the studies' findings on faith, without examining their methodology at all." Sykes
v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2286 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Reasonable minds can differ, however, on whether the shift of the
Supreme Court away from dispute resolution and towards more general-
ized fact-laden rulemaking is a good thing. On the one hand, if the Court
is going to take fewer cases every year and make rules that extend be-
yond the parties before it to offer guidance to everyone, we are better
served if it does not limit itself to the facts these random people litigat-
ing choose to emphasize.244 Concrete cases "are more often distorting
than illuminating," as Fred Schauer puts it,245 and factual authorities
thought important by these parties may change or not adequately reflect
the situations faced by future parties in similar or related circumstances.
On the other hand, party control and the adversarial method have been
around for a long time and comport with our more traditional notions of
the judicial role. By abandoning them, the Court also abandons many of
the virtues of the adversary system-including the fact that "adverse
parties [are] supposed to ensure that courts do not exceed their limited
role in a democratic society" and make general rules ofpolicy.
246
In any event, even assuming one believes it is a good thing for the
Court to act like an administrative agency when it comes to processing
facts, there is a further process-based objection that must be addressed.
What we have now is a mismatch: a body engaged in something like
agency rulemaking but without agency procedural safeguards. Or, if you
like, we have a court seeking expert testimony without any limits on the
evidence these experts can bring.
The result is a procedural mess: unregulated factual claims coming in
by interested parties without transparency (either as to their ultimate
source or as to why they are selected by the Justices) and without rebut-
tal. There is no chance for quality control. The Court should not be using
old court-educating tools like the amicus brief to address a new volume
of legislative fact questions At la an administrative agency. It is here,
thankfully, that analogies to other fact-finding institutions can do some
real work.
244 See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 Cornell L.
Rev. 1, 21-26 (2009); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 883
(2006) [hereinafter Schauer, Bad Law].
245 Schauer, Bad Law, supra note 244, at 884.
246 Gorod, supra note 2, at 15.
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V. WHAT'S NEXT? SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
Assuming the current Supreme Court amicus process is worrisome (at
least for its role in factual questions), the "compared to what?" question
immediately arises. One possible solution is to limit amicus briefs and
permit only those that offer arguments on questions of law. Another pos-
sibility is to let the Justices fend for themselves on the facts, and re-
search these questions on their own. I do not think that the second option
is wise (for reasons I have discussed before), 247 nor do I think the first
restriction is necessary, particularly in light of the value such factual
briefs appear to add at times (at least according to the majority of com-
mentators and Justices).
There is another way. Other areas of the law-specifically the law
surrounding expert witnesses at trial and administrative law addressing
notice-and-comment rulemaking-have evolved over the years to ad-
dress many of the same reliability and transparency problems that I have
highlighted in the Supreme Court amicus process. To reform the latter, it
makes sense to apply the well-developed procedural safeguards from the
former. I address four rules that come from either administrative law or
the law of evidence and recommend applying those quality control safe-
guards to the Supreme Court rules of procedure.
A. Limiting the Number and Scope of Expert "Witnesses"
When a trial court is educating itself (or a jury) on a generalized fac-
tual matter relevant to a pending dispute, it often does so through an ex-
pert witness.248 But the court does not generally open itself up to briefing
by any so-called expert who can find the courthouse steps. Rather the
rules of evidence have developed a gatekeeping system whereby the
court will screen out unreliable expert testimony.
The landmark decision on this is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals, wherein the Supreme Court announced that the trial court
must serve as a quality control screen on expert testimony for the fact
finder.249 Now, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 codifies Daubert and de-
clares that all proffered expert testimony on "scientific, technical, or
247 Larsen, Fact Finding, supra note 2, at 1291.
248 To be sure, a court need not admit expert testimony on a question of legislative fact. As
explained above, the limits on judicial notice do not apply to legislative facts, and so a trial
court is permitted to make a finding of legislative fact without the help of an expert witness.
249 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 (1993).
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other specialized knowledge" must convince the judge of three things:
(1) "the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data," (2) "the testimo-
ny is the product of reliable principles and methods," and (3) "the expert
has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the
case."
250
There are several ways this quality control measure could be imported
to the Supreme Court's amicus rules. First, the Court could limit the
number of amicus briefs filed with new extra-record factual information.
This would not require the Justices to decide who is in and who is out.
Recall the Supreme Court Rules require party consent to file amicus
briefs at all. Although now this consent is freely given, that was not al-
ways the case. At one time the Court even encouraged the Solicitor
General to deny consent to the filing of amicus briefs. 251
The Court could entrust the parties to police which groups are permit-
ted to convey expertise on their behalf. This would give the parties an
incentive to give their blessing only to the one or two amici with the
most reliable information. It would also enable more scrutiny on the fac-
tual claims these limited amici present.
With fewer briefs to examine, the party control and check would also
be more engaged. The current system puts the party lawyers in a strate-
gic bind, for the decision to contest a factual claim by an amicus also
risks drawing attention to that brief in a sea of many briefs. If there were
only one or two factual briefs on each side, however, the strategic awk-
wardness is removed and the parties would feel free to respond to the
claims made by the other side's experts, much like a lawyer would be-
have cross-examining such a witness at trial.
A second alternative along these lines is that the Court could impose a
rule forbidding any amicus brief presenting factual claims from adding
accompanying legal argument. Again this reform comes straight from
the law of evidence.252 There are strict limits on expert witnesses offer-
ing opinions on the law or generally opining on the case's outcome. The
idea of course is that this legal commentary detracts from the status of
250 Fed. R. Evid. 702.
251 See Caldeira & Wright, supra note 41, at 784 n.3.
252 See, e.g., Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359, 364 (2d Cir. 1992); Andrews v. Metro N.
Commuter R.R., 882 F.2d 705, 709 (2d Cir. 1989); FAA v. Landy, 705 F.2d 624, 632 (2d
Cir. 1983).
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the expert as a neutral advisor, and that it oversteps what is the value and
point of an expert witness in the first place.253
Applying this rule to the amicus process would stem the factual ar-
guments that currently come from the pens of the amicus lawyers rather
than from the technical experts themselves (presumably the clients). Of
course there is nothing preventing these groups and their counsel from
framing factual submissions in a light sympathetic to the side they want
to win.
But even so there is still an advantage to divorcing factual claims
from legal argument. Because the secret is out that the Justices value
briefs that supplement their technical knowledge, the vast majority of
amicus briefs stretch to make these factual claims-even if it is beyond
their institutional capacity to do so. If the Court forbade factual briefs
from making legal arguments, these advocacy groups would face a
choice: either present new information for the Court to consider, or
make a pitch to get the Court to rule your way. Not both.
This reform would serve to discourage all advocacy groups from
jumping in the factual pool and claiming to be experts. Presumably,
some advocacy groups write amicus briefs in order to show value to
their constituency. Given the choice between weighing in on a policy
debate or adding facts to the record, these groups might choose the for-
mer. The consequence is a narrowing of the number of factual experts
vying for the Court's attention and the allowance of more scrutiny for
the Justices (and their clerks) to fact check.
B. Transparency of Data Submitted and Methods Used
Also in the spirit of Daubert, the Court could decline to accept any
amicus brief filed with factual claims that are not backed up with an ex-
planation of the methods used to discover them. Perhaps it is unrealistic
that the Justices (or their clerks) would go through the methods em-
ployed by each amicus and evaluate them, but even just having the re-
253 See, e.g., Hygh, 961 F.2d at 364 ("Even if a jury were not misled into adopting outright
a legal conclusion proffered by an expert witness, the testimony would remain objectionable
by communicating a legal standard--explicit or implicit-to the jury.... Whereas an expert
may be uniquely qualified by experience to assist the trier of fact, he is not qualified to com-
pete with the judge in the function of instructing the jury." (citations omitted)). For other ju-
dicial comments expressing the same point, see Andrews, 882 F.2d at 709; Landy, 705 F.2d
at 632.
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quirement at all would serve as a barrier to entry for advocacy groups
that do not use rigorous methods for finding their facts.
The Court could easily impose even minor variations of this reform. It
could, for example, require that any statement of fact in an amicus brief
be supported by data that is publicly available (not "on file with" the au-
thor). Or, the Court could require disclosure when an amicus (or a relat-
ed group) funds or authors a study purporting to establish a factual
claim. Although the current Supreme Court Rules require disclosure of
who financed a brief, they do not require disclosing who paid for any
particular study, "working paper," "fact sheet," blog post, e-mail, or
whatever authority on which the amicus relies to support its factual as-
sertion.
Alternatively, perhaps the Supreme Court Rules could create a limited
way for the parties to respond to unreliability in factual claims. The
Court could permit a limited letter at the end of the amicus submissions
in which the parties can respond-not to legal arguments-but only to
instances where they think the amicus has relied on a shady authority for
a claim of fact.
Recall that the rate of response from the parties to the claims of fact
presented by amici and ultimately relied on by the Justices is surprising-
ly low. The adversary system is currently providing only the very weak-
est of checks on amici fact finding. It is virtually ineffective. As the
number of amici grow and the pool of factual data expands, something
needs to be done to rehabilitate the check from the adversary method.
Even the threat of a response (one that does not take away from the word
limits the parties have to reply to the legal arguments) may discourage
amici from relying on questionable authorities.
C. Factual Issues Should Be "Adequately Flagged" in Advance
A third quality control safeguard available to reform the amicus pro-
cess comes from administrative law and could be accomplished by a rel-
atively simple act of the Court.
The Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency give
"[g]eneral notice of proposed rule making," including "either the terms
or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and is-
sues involved. 254 Over the years, the D.C. Circuit has interpreted this
rule to require that the agency adequately flag whatever rule it is likely
254 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
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to adopt.255 This includes requiring the agency to disclose any statistical
evidence or other materials that influenced its proposal rule.256 As a cor-
ollary, the rule also prohibits an agency from adopting a rule that is not a
"logical outgrowth" of the notice.
25 7
The reasons for these rules are well known. After the notice, interest-
ed parties are given a chance to comment on the agency's proposal. If
the notice fails to provide an accurate picture of the reasoning motivat-
ing the agency's thinking-including the factual basis for its proposal-
the comment period will become meaningless. The fear is that the indus-
try members will not know what criticisms and what factual information
to present and then the agency will operate with a mistaken or lopsided
view of the issues at stake.258
There is a feature of Supreme Court decision making that is analo-
gous to the notice of proposed rulemaking. As Professor Kathryn Watts
has observed, when the Court grants certiorari to hear a case, it is acting
similarly to an administrative agency-that is, it is exercising a congres-
sional delegation of discretion to engage in policy making.259 Watts pro-
poses applying administrative law principles to the certiorari process;
she suggests public disclosure of the votes and required reason-giving at
the certiorari level.26 °
I propose a different lesson from administrative law to apply to the
certiorari grant--one to help reform the Court's use of the amici as ex-
pert witnesses and the subsequent unreliable "evidence" admitted. The
Court could ensure that the factual questions relevant to the case are dis-
255 See, e.g., MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 57 F.3d 1136, 1140-41 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (in-
validating a rule that was foreshadowed in the notice of proposed rulemaking only in a foot-
note).
256See Babette E.L. Boliek, Agencies in Crisis? An Examination of State and Federal
Aiency Emergency Powers, 81 Fordham L. Rev. 3339, 3354 n.72 (2013).
5 See, e.g., Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (defining
"logical outgrowths" to be confined to situations where interested parties can anticipate that
the relevant change was possible); La. Fed. Land Bank Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 336
F.3d 1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (similar); see also Kannan, supra note 238 (discussing the
impact of the logical outgrowth doctrine and adequate notice requirements on administrative
rulemaking).
258 For thoughts on these rationales, see Boliek, supra note 256; Mark Seidenfeld, The
Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Administrative State, 81 Geo. Wash. L. Rev.
1397, 1408 (2013).
259 Kathryn A. Watts, Constraining Certiorari Using Administrative Law Principles, 160
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (2011).
260 Id. at 46-49.
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closed in the certiorari grant. And, as a corollary, it could discipline it-
self not to rely on extra-record facts that were not flagged from the start.
As it currently stands, as Professor Stephanie Tai laments, the scien-
tific community is actually under-represented in the Supreme Court
amicus process.26" ' She argues, specifically in the context of environmen-
tal law, that the "[p]resentation of information by scientists may reach
certain Justices in ways that presentations by environmental advocates
do not and cannot., 2
62
One way to encourage participation by groups who are more knowl-
edgeable on technical matters and perhaps less biased in their presenta-
tion of them is to highlight the importance of the fact at the beginning of
the process-that is, in the certiorari grant. Thus, for example, the Court
could add a question presented announcing that it is interested in, say,
the impact of violent video games on children's brains or the rate of de-
pression in women post-abortion. It can also highlight the source of the
evidence in the record-from testimony before a legislature or experts at
trial.
This signal could take one of several forms. The Court could appoint
an amicus (or two) to specifically brief the fact they are interested in
learning more about. Alternatively, it could appoint a special master to
hear all the views submitted and act as a sorting mechanism for the Jus-
tices, screening out those factual claims that are unreliable. Or, at a min-
imum, the public announcement in the certiorari grant could highlight
the importance of the fact and be enough alone to entice more reputable
factual experts to enter the case.
Granted, some might argue that it is unnecessary for the Justices to
"adequately flag" the factual issues they are interested in learning; eve-
ryone knows, the argument goes, when a factual issue is embedded in a
legal one. Do we really need the Court to announce its intent to delve in-
to neuroscience when the California law banning video games is specifi-
cally justified by the legislature that way?
But the same objection could be made in administrative law at some
level, and yet agencies proposing a rule must still disclose the factual
basis for their proposal. Why? At bottom, the beefed-up notice require-
ment is about ensuring that an agency makes an informed judgment: "to
ensure that agency regulations are tested via exposure to diverse public
261 Tai, supra note 11, at 793.
262 Id. at 827.
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comment... [and] to ensure fairness to affected parties., 263 The same
objectives could apply equally to the Supreme Court fact-finding pro-
cess.
Perhaps the same reasons we force an agency to jump through proce-
dural hoops apply with equal force to the Supreme Court when it is de-
ciding cases with wide policy-making implications. A theme in adminis-
trative law is that more process at the front end makes better substantive
decisions on the back end. A more detailed certiorari grant when legisla-
tive facts are looming would incentivize more reliable players to join the
amicus process, would signal to the parties that they need to devote sig-
nificant time to the issue, and, it is to be hoped, would prevent lopsided,
unreliable, and untested information from unduly influencing the
Court's decisions.264
D. Requiring Response to Significant Counter Evidence
A final option would be for the Supreme Court to respond in its opin-
ion to opposing factual claims, ones that-if true-would make the
Court's position untenable.
Once again this suggestion is taken from a page in administrative law.
At the conclusion of notice-and-comment rulemaking, the APA requires
that an agency justify its rules in what is called a "statement of their ba-
sis and purpose.' 265 The D.C. Circuit has read this rule to require that an
agency respond to every "significant" comment raised by interested par-
ties during the comment period.266 This means the agency must respond
to any comment "which, if true,... would require a change in [the]
agency's proposed rule. 267 The point, of course, is to make the com-
263 Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 407 F.3d 1250,
1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
264 propose flagging the relevant legislative facts at the certiorari grant, but there is no
reason the Court could not do so later in its decision-making process if it only discovers after
the grant that it needs more information on a factual dimension of the case. At that point, the
Court could ask for supplemental briefing. For a potential model of this reform, see Cal.
Gov't Code § 68081 (Deering 2011).
265 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
266 See Reytblatt v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 105 F.3d 715, 722 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Am.
Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1990).267Am. Mining Cong., 907 F.2d at 1188 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ment period meaningful, to facilitate an "exchange of views, 2 68 and to
ensure "a more accurate foundation"2 69 for agency policy making.
Taking the analogy to the Supreme Court, this rule would require the
Justices to acknowledge and explain away competing authorities for fac-
tual claims that may be dispositive to their decision. The point of the
rule would be to push back on the natural tendency to cherry-pick the
factual authorities that help an argument and ignore the inconvenient
ones that do not. For example, this rule would prevent a Justice from cit-
ing the Reardon data in the Carhart amicus brief about post-abortion
depression without acknowledging and explaining away the studies from
other psychologists that seek to discredit it.
Certainly requiring the Justices to respond to "significant" opposing
authority for factual disputes is an additional burden to place on the
Court. But to the extent this seems like too much to ask, consider that
the Justices already do this to some extent in at least one context. Rebec-
ca Haw, in reviewing the Court's treatment of amicus briefs in antitrust
cases, notes that the Court "has spent more time discussing the amicus
briefs on the losing side than on the winning side. 2 70 This, she says,
"suggests that the Court feels an agency-like responsibility to consider
all the perspectives before it. '271
Of course I do not mean to suggest that the Court drop a footnote to
consider an alternative factual claim before it uses a fact in a rhetorical
flourish-as window dressing, or to tell a story. Even administrative law
does not require the agency to respond to every comment made by an in-
terested party. Rather, I suggest adopting the same standard that applies
to an agency's statement of basis and purpose: If the factual claim is so
significant that the opposing assertion could change the Court's result
(which presumably must be a reason the Court is citing it to begin with),
then I suggest it is not too much to ask to require that the Justices re-
spond to opposing authority presented to them. 272
268 Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (emphasis omitted).
269 Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276, 1286 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted.
I Haw, supra note 45, at 1257 (emphasis omitted).
271 Id.
272 It is worth noting that this reform would work well in conjunction with the one previ-
ously mentioned-allowing the parties to respond in a limited way to amicus-presented au-
thority.
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CONCLUSION
The amicus brief has served a valuable role over time in educating
Supreme Court Justices and supplementing the arguments the parties can
make. But times have changed. There is a new emphasis in Supreme
Court decision making on generalized factual claims and a turn toward
empirical factual support for legal arguments. There is also a brave new
world of factual data that can be marshaled easily and quickly by any in-
terested party that can call itself an expert. The Court seems hungry for
factual information; it consumes it at a greater rate than the parties and
the record can provide. But by turning to motivated interest groups to fill
the need-and indeed relying on the amicus briefs themselves as evi-
dence on factual claims-the Court risks tainting its decisions with unre-
liable evidence. It is time to rethink the expertise-providing role of the
Supreme Court amicus, and to refashion this old tool for the new pur-
pose for which it is currently being used.
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Citations to Amicus Briefs in Supreme Court Opinions, 2008-2013
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Thomas 8 Constitutional Law 79
Roberts 11 Voting Rights 2
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Souter 2 Healthcare 1
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Stevens 3
Sotomayor 20
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Opinion
Citations for Facts
Without a Party 89
Response
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panied by a "see al-
so" cite, a study, or
an article)
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Determinative
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